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FOURTH AMENDMENT PRIVACY AND
STANDING: "WHEREVER THE TWAIN
SHALL MEET"
MELvRn GUTTERMANt
Thefourth amendment refers to the "tight of thepeople " to befree
from unreasonable searches and seizures The exclusionary doctrine
has been the princioal method used by the Supreme Court to protect
"the people" against unwarranted governmental intrusions. In recent
years this exclusionary rule has come under mounting judicial attack,
and the Court has seized upon the fourth amendment standing concept
as a means of limiting its harsh effects. In this Artle Professor Gutter-
man analyzes the Court's emerging doctrinal approach to fourth
amendment privacy in four areas.- privacy rights in papers, misplaced
confidences, required confidences, andprivacy expectations in cars and
other containers. Professor Gutterman argues that the ultimate issue in
evaluating fourth amendment privacy interests is what governmental
conduct we, as "the people" of a free society, are entitled to expect.
Professor Gutterman concludes that fourth amendment privacy issues
are best resolved by pursuing separate analyses regarding what privacy
interests are important enough to "the people" to be protected by the
fourth amendment and what persons are entitled under the circum-
stances to that protection. By merging the questions of what interests
are protected and who is entitled to that protection, the Court has cut
back on the effectiveness of the exclusionary rule and narrowed "the
people's" reasonable expectations ofprivacy
INTRODUCTION
The core value of the fourth amendment' is to safeguard the privacy and
security of "the people" against arbitrary invasions by the government. 2 The
fourth amendment speaks collectively of "the right of the people,"3 embody-
ing the belief of our Nation's forefathers that the value of the "people's" pri-
vacy in their homes and persons would not be invaded except upon strong
t Professor of Law, Emory University. B.A., 1959, University of Michigan; J.D., 1962,
Brooklyn Law School; L.L.M., 1967, Northwestern University.
I wish to thank Adele Baker, my research assistant, for her considerable help in the prepara-
tion of this Article.
I. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. Coast. amend. IV.
2. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S.
523 (1967); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
3. Cf. U.S. Const. amend. IllI ("without the consent of the Owner"); U.S. Coust. amend. V
('[n]o person shall"); U.S. Const. amend. VI ("the accused shall").
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government need and under strictprocedural safeguards.4
Early Supreme Court decisions placed privacy in an exalted position
within the hierarchy of constitutionally protected values5 and provided a
strong foundation for the Court's continued concern with its protection.6 Al-
though the Court has never articulated clearly the specific doctrinal perspec-
tive under which it operates in developing the scope of fourth amendment
privacy protections,7 Justice Brandeis eloquently summarized the essence of
the amendment in observing that the makers of the constitution "conferred, as
against the Government, the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of
rights and the right most valued by civilized men." Justice Brandeis' enunci-
ation of the importance of regulating government conduct transcends individ-
ual privacy rights and focuses upon the "collective nature" of fourth
amendment protections, 9 that is, the "people's right" to be protected from un-
limited governmental intrusion into the privacies protected by the fourth
amendment.
The exclusionary doctrine is the principal method developed by the Court
to protect against arbitrary privacy intrusions by the government. In imposing
the exclusionary rule on state courts in Mapp v. Ohio,10 the Court emphasized
the basic deterrent purpose of the doctrine, but the majority recognized that
the rule also serves the purpose of ensuring "the imperative of judicial integ-
rity."" Building on Justice Brandeis' thesis that the government is the "omni-
present teacher" that "teaches the whole people by its example,"' t the Mapy
majority believed that "[njothing can destroy a government more quickly than
its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the charter of its
own existence."
13
While the "'prime purpose'" of the exclusionary doctrine "'is to deter
future unlawful police conduct,"" 4 continued recognition of the judicial in-
tegrity goal will keep the rule operating in tandem with the developing basic
4. See generally J. Landynski, Search and Seizure and The Supreme Court (1966); N. Las-
son, The History and Development of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
(1970); T. Taylor, Two Studies in Constitutional Interpretation (1969).
5. See lloyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
6. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
7. Professor Amsterdam has indicated that "the Supreme Court is operating on the atomis-
tic view, although it has never discussed the issue." Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth
Amendment, 58 Minn. L. Rev. 349, 367 (1974). Professor Bacigal addresses the question whether
"the fourth amendment should be viewed from an individual perspective, which emphasizes pro-
tection of the interests of individual citizens, or from a limitation perspective, which emphasizes
the regulation of governmental conduct." Bacigal, Some Observations and Proposals on the Na-
ture of the Fourth Amendment, 46 Ceo. Wash. L. Rev. 529, 529-30 (1978).
8. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting),
9. Justice Brandeis stated that the framers "sought to-protect Americans ia their beliefs,
their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations." Id. at 478.
10. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
11. Id. at 659 (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960)).
12. 367 U.S. at 659 (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting)).
13. 367 U.S. at 659.
14. United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 446 (1976) (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414
U.S. 338, 347 (1974)).
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core of fourth amendment rights, "assuring the people-all potential victims
of unlawful government conduct-that the government would not profit from
its lawless behavior, thus minimizing the risk of seriously undermining popu-
lar trust in government." 1 5 The exclusionary doctrine is under increasing at-
tack, and recent decisions have attempted to ameliorate its harsh effects.
1 6
The fourth amendment standing doctrine has provided the Court a significant
method for judicial limitation of the operation of the exclusionary concept,17
but in developing the doctrine the Court has severely diminished the privacy
protections embodied within the fourth amendment.
The standing doctrine assuredly operates from an atomistic perspective,
requiring the individual to establish that he was a "person aggrieved" by a
search.18 Although a personal injury resulting from a privacy invasion is a
necessary component of the determination that an individual's protected right
has been violated, the doctrine of standing is in a transitional period and is
becoming more closely interwoven with the developing concepts of substantive
fourth amendment privacy rights.' 9 In Rakas . Illinois,20 the Court deter-
mined that no useful purpose would be served by considering standing distinct
from the merits of fourth amendment coverage, and that the better analysis
would focus forthrightly on the extent of the individual's rights under the
fourth "rather than on any theoretically separate, but invariably intertwined
concept of standing." 2'
The Supreme Court has recently begun to develop a specific doctrinal
approach to fourth amendment privacy in four principal areas: privacy rights
in papers, misplaced confidences, required confidences, and privacy expecta-
tions in cars and other containers. This article examines privacy rights in these
contexts and concludes that although accommodation between the collective
and individualistic perspectives is desirable when determining fourth amend-
ment standing, the ultimate issue in evaluating the nature of fourth amend-
ment privacy interests must be what we collectively, as members of a free
society, are entitled to expect from our government.
22
15. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 357 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Cf. Stone v.
Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 485 (1976) ("While courts, of course, must ever be concerned with preserv-
Lug the integrity of the judicial process, this concern has limited force as a justification for the
exclusion of highly probative evidence."); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 458 n.35 (1976)
("The primary meaning of 'judicial integrity' in the context of evidentiary rules is that the courts
must not commit or encourage violations of the Constitution.").
16. See, e.g., United States v. Haven, 446 U.S. 620 (1980); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465
(1976); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
17. See, e.g., Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980), discussed at notes 341-53 and accom-
panying text infra; United States v. Payner, 447 US. 727 (1980), discussed at notes 360-63 and
accompanying text infra; Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978), discussed at notes 323-40 and
accompanying text infra.
18. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 265 (1960).
19. See Gutterman, "A Person Aggrieved": Standing to Suppress Illegally Seized Evidence
in Transition, 23 Emory L.J. 111 (1974).
20. 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
21. Id. at 139.
22. See Amsterdam, supra note 7, at 367.
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Kim: A 'WATERHED DECISION" IN FOURTH AMENDMENT PRIVACY
Katz v. United States 3 represents an extension of fourth amendment pro-
tections beyond the limits of electronic surveillance involved in that case. In
Katz, government officials without a search warrant installed an electronic
listening and recording device to the outside of a public telephone booth and
overheard Katz's side of a conversation relating to an illegal wagering transac-
tion. The Katz Court declared that a privacy-oriented analysis should replace
the traditional property approach. After first warning that the fourth amend-
ment cannot be translated into a general privacy right, the Court noted that
"ft]he Fourth Amendment protects people-and not simply 'areas'-against
unreasonable searches" and further "that the reach of that Amendment cannot
turn upon the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given enclo-
sure." 24 The Court focused upon Katz's conduct and determined that by pay-
ing his toll and shutting the telephone door behind him, Katz was surely
"entitled" to expect privacy.25 The government's conduct directed at Katz
therefore "violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied" 20 and thus
constituted a search and seizure within the "new" fourth amendment parlance.
The police activities were condemned as unreasonable in the absence of a
warrant,
By reshaping the contours of privacy expectations, Katz has become the
basis for determining the parameters of the fourth amendment's protections.27
The "privacy concept" it enunciated was not, however, a monumental shift in
fourth amendmentjurisprudence. The fourth's "privacy" roots are deeply em-
bedded in English and American history,28 and Katz's spirit was captured by
the Court long ago in Boyd v. United States.2 9 The Boyd decision emphasized
that the inherent nature of a free society and its citizens requires security
against all invasions of the government upon the privacies of life.30 The Boyd
Court acknowledged the imperative of broadly interpreting the fourth and
fifth amendments' protections since a close and literal construction would lead
to a gradual erosion ofthe rights protected.
31
Although Katz declared that a privacy-oriented analysis should replace
the traditional property approach, the majority opinion provides only mini-
mum guidance in capturing the essence of this new doctrinal focus32 beyond
23. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
24. Id. at 353.
25. Id. at 352 (emphasis added).
26. Id. at 353.
27. See Amsterdar, supra note 7, at 382; Kitch, Katz Y. United States: The Limits of the
Fourth Amendment, 1968 Sup. Ct Rev. 133.
28. See generally books cited note 4 supra.
29. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
30. Id, at 630.
31. Id, at 635.
32. As Professor Amsterdam has noted, "An opinion which sets aside prior formulas with the
observation that they cannot 'serve as a talismanic solution to every Fourth Amendment problem'
should hardly be read as intended to replace them with a new talisman." Amsterdam, supra note
7, at 385 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 351 at n.9).
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the Court's pronouncement that the government's activities in electronically
eavesdropping on Katz's conversation violated his justifiable privacy expecta-
tion in the private use of the public telephone. Justice Harlan's concurring
opinion, to which subsequent courts have turned for guidance, articulates the
subjective nature of the test in a more comprehensive form. Justice Harlan
stated that his understanding of prior decisions and the "new rule" required a
two-fold analysis: "first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is
prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.' "-3 For Justice Harlan, the critical fac-
tor in Katz was Katz's actions in "protecting his privacy," which made his
expectations "reasonable."' 34 By highlighting the means employed by Katz to
preserve his privacy, the Katz Court gave notice that in the absence of an
individual actively protecting his privacy, a person's privacy expectations may
not be "reasonable' 35 no matter how highly intrusive or offensive the police
conduct.
Katz's major flaw is apparent: the determination whether the governmen-
tal activity constitutes a search and seizure may depend not upon the govern-
ment's conduct, but rather upon the conduct of the person subjected to the
government's activity. By focusing the analysis upon the person's justifiable
expectations as manifested by his conduct, the Court has effectively imnmu-
nized from judicial control a broad range of otherwise very intrusive privacy
invasions.36 Although the "normal precautions" that an individual does or
does not take to secure his privacy may manifest the "reasonableness" of his
conduct and evidence a desire to maintain his privacy, these precautions do
not add to or detract from the "unreasonableness" of the government activity
or the nature of the privacies protected by the fourth amendment.
The appropriate perspective must be much broader-a collective one
based on "society's generally shared [privacyl expectations."'37 This interpre-
tation complies with the spirit of the fourth, for it is "the people" who are to be
secure from intrusive police conduct; this security is not limited by or depen-
dent upon the means an individual employs to protect his privacy from gov-
ernment overreaching. The fundamental inquiry must be whether the police
practice jeopardizes our "sense of security, which is the paramount concern of
Fourth Amendment liberties.' 3 Justice Harlan, returning to Katz in his dis-
33. 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
34. Id.
35. See Dworkin, Fact Style Adjudication and the Fourth Amendment: The Limits of Lawy-
ering, 48 Ind. LJ. 329, 336 (1973).
36. See, e.g., Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980), discussed at notes 341-53 and accom-
panying text infra; Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979), discussed at notes 20S-11 and accom-
panying text infra; Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) discussed at notes 323-40 and
accompanying text infra; United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976), discussed at notes 177-204,
371-72 and accompanying text infra; Caldwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974), discussed at notes
235-57 and accompanying text infa United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971), discussed at
notes 141-48, 167-71 and accompanying text infra; Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966),
discussed at notes 122-40 and accompanying text infra. See Dworkin, supra note 35, at 335.
37. Kitch, supra note 27, at 137. See also Amsterdam, supra note 7, at 403.
38. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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sent in United States v. "fte, 39 altered his previous analysis by asserting that
the proper analysis must "transcend the search for subjective expectations,"
for "[ojur expectations, and the risks we assume, are in large part reflections of
laws that translate into rules the customs and values of the past and present."
40
Deciding which interests in our shared security expectations are protected by
the fourth amendment is, of course, a value judgment about which "we" may
differ. The Court's task in discerning these interests and in determining
whether to gather within the fourth's protective shield the specific privacy in-
terests involved is not merely to "mirror and reflect" the past, but to "form and
project" for the future, mindful that it is our "sense of security" that is jeop-
ardized when a particular police practice is left totally unregulated. 41
PRIVACY RIGHTS IN PAPERS
The unique nature of private papers historically gave them a paramount
position in the hierarchy of constitutionally protected privacy interests.42 In
_8oyd . United States,43 Justice Bradley imaginatively created an "intimate
relationship" linking the fourth and fifth amendments. The Justice construed
liberally the privacy interests protected by these amendments, concluding that
there was no substantial difference between compelling a person to be a wit-
ness against himself through the forced production of his books and papers
and through the seizure of these books and papers by the government. 44
Justice Bradley asserted that the privacy interests protected by the fourth
and fifth amendments affect the very essence of constitutional liberty and se-
curity. Relying on Entick v. Carrington,4- he argued vigorously that the
amendments' protections "reach farther than the concrete form of the case"
and "apply to all invasions on the part of the government and its employe's of
the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life.""4
Justice Bradley further charted the course that elevated the protected
privacies to an exalted position by declaring firmly that
It is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers,
that constitutes the essence of the offence, but it is the invasion of his
indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty and private
property, where that right has never been forfeited by his conviction
of some public offence,7-it is the invasion of this sacred right which
underlies and constitutes the essence of Lord Camden's judgment.
Breaking into a house and opening boxes and drawers are circun-
stances of aggravation; but any forcible and compulsory extortion of
39. 401 U.S. 745 (1970).
40. Id. at 786 (Harlan, ., dissenting).
41. Id.
42. See McKenna, The Constitutional Protection of Private Papers: The Role ora Hierardhl-
cal Fourth Amendment, 53 Ind. LJ. 55 (1977-78).
43. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
44. Id. at 633.
45. 19 How. St. Tr. 1029 (C.P. 1765).
46. 116 U.S. at 630.
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a man's own testimony or of his private papers to be used as evidence
to convict him of crime or to forfeit his goods, is within the condem-
nation of that judgment. In this regard, the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments run almost into each other.47
The Court thus created a zone of privacy encompassing a person's private
papers into which the government could not enter either by compulsion under
subpoena or by seizure for use at a criminal trial. Boyd embraced an absolu-
tist view, establishing that any governmental intrusion into private papers is
"unreasonable" regardless of the manner in which they are obtained. Boyd's
absolute fourth and fifth amendments' safeguard for books and private papers
was a result of common law property principles justifying these protections.
48
With the changing concepts of property/privacy and societal ideas of privacy,
Boyd's absolute safeguard has given way to a more realistic view of the protec-
tions provided by these amendments. 49
Katz Y. United States50 "marks a watershed"' in the development of
fourth amendment privacy concepts. Katz sharply altered Boyd's perspective
which had determined the validity of a search and seizure by primary refer-
ence to an individual's property rights. The Court in Katz developed its pri-
vacy doctrine by detaching fourth amendment rights from traditional property
concepts. In bringing electronic eavesdropping within the scope of fourth
amendment protection, the Court focused its inquiry on Katz's privacy expec-
tations in using a public telephone rather than on whether the public tele-
phone was a "constitutionally protected area."' 2  Since "the Fourth
Amendment protects people, not places,"5 3 the Government's activities in
electronically listening to and recording Katz's words violated his 'Justifiable
expectation of privacy" in the use of the telephone booth and thereby consti-
tuted a search and seizure within the meaning of the fourth amendment.54
The eavesdropping, conducted without a warrant, was unreasonable, and,
therefore, the evidence obtained was inadmissible.5 '
The Katz Court in reviewing the eavesdropping maintained that the con-
stitutional defect was not Katz's failure to receive absolute protection from
government intrusion upon his private conversation but rather the agent's fail-
47. Id.
48. See Note, The Life and Times ofBoyd .United Stales (1886-1976), 76 Mich. L. Rev. 184,
189 (1977).
49. See Note, Formalism, Legal Realism, and Constitutionally Protected Privacy Under the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 945 (1977).
50. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
51. Amsterdam, supra note 7, at 382; see also 1 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure, A Treatise
on the Fourth Amendment § 2.1, at 228 (1978).
52. 389 U.S. at 351.
53. Id.
54. The fact that the electronic device employed did not penetrate the wall of the booth had
for the Court "no constitutional significance', id. at 353, thus ending the severely criticized tres-
pass doctrine which the Court had developed in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
For criticism of the trespass doctrine, see King, Wire Tapping and Electronic Surveillance: A
Neglected Constitutional Consideration, 66 Dick. L. Rev. 17 (1961); Sullivan, Wiretapping and
Eavesdropping: A Review of the Current Law, 18 Hastings L.J. 59 (1966.67).
55. 389 U.S. at 359.
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ure to obtain a warrant.56 This sharp contrast between Yoyd's vision of the
fourth and fifth amendments and the more modernistic Katz viewpoint that
narrows Boyd's absolute privacy protection has major significance in the pro-
tections accorded an individual's private papers. This difference is strikingly
presented in a trilogy of cases beginning with Couch V. United States?
7
In Couch, the Court determined that the fifth amendment rights of a tax-
payer were not violated by enforcement of a documentary summons directed
to the taxpayer's accountant demanding the production of the taxpayer's
records then in the accountant's possession. The Court asserted that the fifth
amendment privilege is designed to prevent the exertion of "physical or moral
compulsion" upon the accused and concluded that the personal nature of the
privilege applies only when the accused himself is compelled to produce the
evidence. 8 The Court reasoned that the necessary ingredient of personal
compusion was absent,5 9 and distinguished Boyd on the ground that the Boyds
both owned andpossessed the invoices ordered, while Couch had neither actual
nor constructive possession of the documents subpoenaed.
60
The Court, in deciding Couch's fourth amendment claim, found that she
lacked a legitimate expectation of privacy in the contents of the records
handed to her accountant because mandatory disclosure of much of the same
information was required on her income tax return. Since the "expectation of
privacy" in the contents of the papers necessary to launch a valid fourth
amendment claim under Katz did not exist and the summons had satisfied
constitutional requirements, Couch's constitutional claim was dismissed
summarily."
By treating Couch's fourth and fifth amendment rights as basically unre-
lated, the Court began the separation of the "intimate" relationship that Jus-
tice Bradley had envisioned in Boyd.62 In a strongly worded dissent, Justice
Douglas faulted the majority for "ignoring the interplay of the fundamental
values protected by the Fourth and Fifth amendments," 63 declaring, as he had
in Warden v. Hayden,"M his constitutional philosophy that the boundaries of
the right to privacy make an individual's personal effects and possessions sac-
rosanct from governmental intrusion. Although the subpoena in Boyd was
directed to the person asserting the privileges, for Justice Douglas this fact
would not obscure the basic thrust of Boyd's reasoning that "the Fourth and
Fifth Amendments delineate a 'sphere of privacy' which must be protected
56. Id.
57. 409 U.S. 322 (1973).
58. Id. at 334-36.
59. However, the Court did concede that "situations may well arise where constructive pos-
session is so clear or the relinquishment of possession is so temporary and insignificant as to leave
the personal compulsions upon the accused substantially intact." Id. at 333.
60. Id. at 330-3 I.
61. Id. at 336 n.19.
62. See text accompanying notes 43-48 supra and notes 375-77 infra.
63. 409 U.S. at 338-39 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
64. 387 U.S. 294, 325 (1967) (Douglas, L, dissenting).
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against governmental intrusion. 65
Further separation of the "intimate relationship" occurred in both Fisher
v. United States66 and Andresen v. Maryland.67 In the former case, after the
Internal Revenue Service (I.R.S.) had begun an investigation into possible
civil and criminal liability, the taxpayer, Fisher, obtained various work papers
prepared by his accountant for income tax purposes and then gave them to his
attorney. The Court upheld subpoenas directed to the taxpayer's attorney to
surrender the accountant's work papers on the ground that the subpoenas
would have been valid even if directed at Fisher.68
Justice White, writing for the majority, began by analyzing separately the
fifth and fourth amendment rights, the former concerned primarily with per-
sonal compulsion 69 and the latter with privacy interests. 70 Severing the inti-
mate relationship, Justice White asserted that no fifth amendment general
right to privacy exists apart from the right against compelled self-incrimina-
tion. Personal privacy, asserted Justice White, is addressed directly in the
fourth amendment and subject to the safeguards incorporated in that amend-
ment.71 It was only by invoking the attorney-client privilege that Fisher was
permitted to assert his flfth amendment claim.
Comparing Fisher's fifth amendment claim to Boyd's, Justice White rec-
ognized that as a result of its pronouncements, Boyd was understood to de-
clare that the seizure of purely evidentiary materials, including private papers
taken from an individual under warrant or subpoena, violated the fourth
amendment and thus rendered these materials inadmissible under the fifth.
72
But he argued that Warden v. Hayden,73 which permitted under proper cir-
curmstances the search for and seizure of purely evidentiary materials, washed
away the foundations of the Boyd rule. Consequently, "the prohibition
against forcing the production of private papers has long been a rule searching
for a rationale." 74 By applying the Schmerber v. Caiffornia7" principle "that
the Fifth Amendment does not independently proscribe the compelled pro-
duction of every sort of incriminating evidence but applies only when the ac-
65. 409 U.S. at 339-40 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
66. 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
67. 427 U.S. 463 (1976).
6B. 425 U.S. at 414.
69. Id. at 398.
70. Id. at 400.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 407.
73. 387 U.S. 294 (1967). Hayden overruled the "mere evidence rule" announced in Gouled
v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 305-06, 309-11 (1921), which concluded that items not illegal but of
only evidentiary value to prove the guilt of the defendant could not be seized pursuant to a
warrant
74. 425 U.S. at 409.
75. 384 U.S. 757 (1966). In Schmerber, the Court upheld the taking of a blood sample by a
doctor in a hospital from a person accused of driving while intoxicated. The Court held that the
practice did not violate the defendant's fifth amendment rights since he was not being "com-
pelled" to testify against himself. There was no fourth amendment violation since the "search"
was incident to a valid arrest and the exigencies of the situation (alcohol would dissipate from the
blood stream) permitted the warrantless search.
1981]
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cused is compelled to make a testimonial communication that is
incriminating,' '76 Justice White was able to assert that the production of the
accountant's work papers was neither sufficiently testimonial nor sufficiently
incriminating to require its invocation. He reasoned that however incriminat-
ing the contents of the accountant's work papers might have been, production
of the papers was the only act the taxpayer was compelled to do, and this did
not in and of itself involve testimonial self-incrimination. Because the govern-
ment already knew the papers were in the taxpayer's possession, "the taxpayer
adds little or nothing to the sum total of the Government's information by
conceding that he in fact has the papers." 71 Having determined that by pro-
ducing the accountant's work papers the taxpayer vouches for neither their
accuracy nor authenticity, Justice White concluded that compliance with the
summons involved no incriminating testimony protected indirectly through
the attorney-client privilege or directly by the fifth amendment.
78
The Court in tndresen addressed the question which it specifically left
open in Hayden: "whether there are items of evidential value whose very na-
ture precludes them from being the object of a reasonable search and
seizure."' 79 In Andresen, detectives of a bi-county fraud unit investigating a
land fraud scheme, obtained a search warrant for and seized the business
records which Andresen had maintained as part of that fraudulent scheme.
Following the Fisher rule that the fifth amendment is not violated when an
individual is not "compelled" to do anything, the Court held that the fifth
amendment provides no protection against a search and seizure of an individ-
ual's office for his business records., Misapplying Boyd's concept of the "inti-
mate relation" between the fourth and fifth amendments,8 ' Justice Blackmun,
writing for the Court, stated that the legal predicate for the inadmissibility of
the evidence in Boyd was a violation of the fourth amendment; the unlawful-
ness of the search was necessary to supply the compulsion essential to invoke
the fifth amendment 82 Because there was no fourth amendment violation,
Boyd's "convergence theory" was held inapplicable.
Boyd's principle, recast in Fisher-,4ndresen terms, is that no material re-
ceives absolute protection under the fifth amendment and privacy protections
are limited to the fourth amendment's procedural safeguards. The zone of
privacy created by Justice Bradley in Boyd and vigorously espoused by Justice
Douglas in Couch now may be breached by the government either pursuant to
76. 425 U.S. at 408.
77. id. at 411.
78. Id. at 414.
79. 387 U.S. at 303.
80. 427 U.S. at 477.
81. See Note, supra note 48, at 210.
82. 427 U.S. at 472. In fact Boyd did not decide that a fourth amendment violation was a
prerequisite to activating fifth amendment safeguards. Boyd held that the fourth and ffilth amend-
ments coalesced to produce a zone of privacy around one's papers and indicated that even if the
mandates of the fourth were complied with, the government still could not compel a man to
produce evidence against himself, by search warrant or subpoena, in violation of the fifth amend-
ment. 116 U.S. at 637-38.
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a valid subpoena or by a search under a lawful warrant. Almost a century
after its birth, the Boyd absolutist privacy-content doctrine has been lost, al-
though it has not been given a, suitable burial.
The papers seized in Andresen, as the Court repeatedly stressed, were
"business records," possibly permitting a distinction from the evaluation of the
privacy expectation attached to purely personal documents such as private di-
aries. The theoretical underpinnings of Andresen, however, leave little doubt
that even the most private and personal of papers are subject to fourth amend-
ment seizure.83 Thus, the question left open in Hayden whether there are
some items which are so personal in nature that a reasonable search and
seizure of them would never lie, appears to have been answered negatively.84
Andresen makes it abundantly clear that it is not the contents but the manner
in which documents are obtained that is determinative of the constitutional
claims and, therefore, that the procedural requirements of the warrant clause
are the sole means of protecting personal privacy.
Clearly, the Andresen Court rejected the "content approach" for business
records, and neither the majority nor dissenting opinions discussed the possi-
bility that the reasonableness clause of the fourth amendment might have
some independent significance on the content doctrine when the search is for
purely private documents. Subsequently, in Zurcher v. Stanford Daily,85 the
Court held that the fourth amendment reasonableness clause did not forbid
the states from issuing a warrant to search for evidence simply because the
owner or possessor of the place to be searched is not reasonably suspected of
criminal involvement. 86 Justice White, writing for the majority, implied that
in some circumstances the reasonableness clause may be a limitation on
searches even when probable cause does exist.
87
In Zurcher, the Stanford Daily, a campus newspaper, published articles
and photographs of a clash between demonstrators and police at a hospital. A
search warrant was issued on the basis of probable cause to believe that the
newspaper, whose staff members had not been involved in the clash, possessed
83. One commentator has stated that, "No zone of privacy now exists that the government
cannot enter to take an individual's property for the purpose of obtaining incriminating informa-
tion. In most cases, the zone can be entered by the issuance of a subpoena; in the rest, it can be
breached by a search warrant." Note, supra note 48, at 211 (footnote omitted). But E. 1 W.
LaFave, supra note 51, § 2.6 at 395. (There may be an absolute immunity against seizure of
diaries and very private papers because society's interest in seeing the papers will never outweigh
the individual's interest in the sanctity of his highly personal effects; "[tIhis question was neither
raised nor resolved in Andresen." Id.)
84. It has been postulated that,
Conjecturally, if as Andresen holds, the fifth amendment privilege is unavailable
when evidence is acquired by search and seizure, as compulsion would be lacking, then
even the most private, and probably most testimonial, written matter--the diary-would
be amenable to seizure, assuming that the warrant could meet the probable cause and
specificity criteria of the fourth amendment.
Comment, A Paper Chase: The Search and Seizure of Personal Business Records, 43 Brooklyn L.
Rev. 489, 501 (1976).
85. 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
86. Id. at 560.
87. Id. at 559-60.
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photographs and negatives of the demonstrators who had assaulted a police
officer. A search pursuant to the warrant was conducted by four police officers
in the presence of several members of the Daily staff. The Daily's photo-
graphic laboratories, filing cabinets, desks and wastepaper baskets were
searched, but no locked drawers or rooms were opened.88 The search revealed
only the published photographs, and no materials were removed from the
Daily office.
One month later, the Daily brought a civil action in United States District
Court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief,89 alleging that the search of
the offices violated its constitutional rights guaranteed by the first, fourth and
fourteenth amendments. The district court granted declaratory relief, holding
that the fourth amendment forbade the issuance of a warrant to search for
materials in possession of one not suspected of a crime unless there is probable
cause to believe that a subpoena duces tecum would be impractical. 90
The Supreme Court rejected the district court's ruling, declaring that the
critical element in any reasonable search is not that the owner of the property
area to be searched is suspected of committing a crime but rather that there is
probable cause to believe the related items to be searched for and seized are
located on the property.91 Once it determined that "it]he fourth amendment
itself has struck the balance between privacy and public need," 92 the Court
deemed it unnecessary to factor in any additional considerations involving in-
nocent-third-party searches.
Noting that the state interest in enforcing the criminal laws and in recov-
ering evidence is the same whether or not the third party is suspected of crimi-
nal conduct, the Court was not persuaded that requiring the state's
investigation to proceed by the less intrusive subpoena duces tecum "would
substantially further privacy interests without seriously undermining law en-
forcement efforts." 93 In support of the Court's conclusion that a subpoena
might have adverse effects on criminal investigation, Justice White noted that
search warrants often are employed early in an investigation and that "[t]he
seemingly blameless third party in possession of the fruits or evidence may not
be innocent at aU"; if he is, he may still be sympathetic to those culpable so
that he cannot be trusted to preserve the evidence or to resist notifying those
who may wish to destroy it.94 Because search warrants generally are more
88. Id. at 551 n.2. The District Court found it unnecessary to resolve the issue whether the
officers, who apparently had an opportunity to read notes and correspondence during the search,
had exceeded the bounds of the warrant. Id.
89. The relief was sought under 42 U.s.C § 1983 (1976).
90. 353 F. Supp. 124 (N.D. Cal. 1972). The district court further held that where the search is
of a newspaper, first amendment considerations make the search constitutionally permissible only
in the rare circumstance where there is a clear showing that a subpoena would be impractical
because the materials would be destroyed or removed from the jurisdiction, and where a re-
straining order would be futile. Id. at 135. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit aftirmcd in
a per curiam opinion. 550 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1977).
91. 436 U.S. at 556.
92. Id. at 559.
93. Id. at 560.
94. Id. at 561.
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difficult to obtain than are subpoenas, Justice White reasoned that the rational
prosecutor, if given the choice, would proceed by subpoena unless he deter-
mined that a search by warrant was necessary to avoid the destruction of evi-
dence. Viewing the choice in this manner, the Court was not convinced that
the net gain to privacy interests by generally requiring subpoenas in true third-
party searches 'ould be worth the candle."
95
Justice Stevens, in dissent, was concerned with the type of showing that
should be required to conduct a search for documentary evidence in the pri-
vate files of persons not suspected of criminal involvement.96 He recognized
that Warden Y. Hayden expanded not only the category of objects which may
be seized, but also the category of persons and the character of the privacy
interests affected by an unannounced police search, and determined that a
showing of probable cause to justify a warrant in pre-Hayden days may not
satisfy the new dimensions of fourth amendment privacy in the post-Hayden
era.9"
Zurcher's most dangerous consequence is that it condones the most intru-
sive of fourth amendment privacy invasions, that of totally innocent third par-
ties' private documents, without appropriate consideration of competing
fourth amendment privacy interests. Numerous law-abiding citizens have
documents in their possession which may aid the government in its criminal
investigations, but to subject these citizens to unannounced police searches
would involve a serious intrusion upon their privacy. Surely these innocent
members of our society are entitled to some extra dimension in protecting their
privacy and reasonably can expect the courts to compel the government to use
the least intrusive method when their privacy interests must be invaded.98 As
95. Id. at 562. The district court noted that in fact the innocent third party is unlikely to
receive protection of his privacy interests since the exclusionary rule will provide little deterrent,
as to him, against unreasonable searches and seizures. The court stated, "Unlike one suspected of
a crime, the third party has no meaningful remedy or protection against an unlawful search, with
or without a warrant, and an additional safeguard is necessary to assure that his Fourth Amend-
ment rights are not trampled." 353 F. Supp. at 132. The Supreme Court did not find it necessary,
in protecting the first amendment free press interest, to impose the less intrusive subpoena duces
tecunm method in obtaining evidence. Although acknowledging the long struggle between the
crown and the press, the Court determined that when "[p]roperly administered, the preconditions
for a warrant-probable cause, specificity with respect to the place to be searched and the things
to be seized, and overall reasonableness-should afford sufficient protection against the harms
that are assertedly threatened by warrants for searching newspaper offices.' 436 U.S. at 565.
Justice Stewart, in dissent, noted that the practice of searching a newspaper, even upon war-
rant, would cause many confidential "sources" to fear that their identities would be revealed and,
therefore, to cease communicating with journalists. He concluded that the practice in question
was prohibited by the first and fourth amendments. Id. at 571-72 (Stewart, ., dissenting).
Congress responded to Zureher by passing the Privacy Protection Act of 1980, Pub. L. No.
96-440, 94 Stat. 1879 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000aa, 2000aa-5 to -7, -11, -12 (West Supp.
1980)) which provides that government officers must use the lesser intrusive subpoena duces te-
cur to obtain materials from persons engaged in disseminating information to the public. Only
under certain limited exceptions may the more intrusive search warrant be used. See 42 T.S.C.A.
§ 2000aa (West Supp. 1980).
96. 436 U.S. at 577 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 582.
98. Clearly Congress has expressed its preference for the subpoena method by mandating the
Attorney General to develop guidelines which would require federal officers to use the least intru-
sive method of obtaining documentary evidence from innocent third persons, especially from
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Justice Stevens proposed, since "[m]ere possession of documentary evidence,
however, is much less likely to demonstrate that the custodian is guilty of any
wrongdoing or that he will not honor a subpoena or informal request to pro-
duce it," and because "It]he only conceivable justification for an unannounced
search of an innocent citizen is the fear that, if notice were given, he would
conceal or destroy the object of the search," 99 the probable cause showing
must demonstrate that there is a need for the unannounced search to prevent
the destruction of evidence. In the absence of an expanded probable cause
showing, the standard of reasonableness embodied in the first clause of the
fourth amendment does not justify this degree of privacy intrusion.100
Amidst the interplay of these competing policy considerations there is a
specific danger unique to the search of private papers. History shows that the
abuse of the general warrant or writ of assistance was a primary concern of the
colonists and a motivating force behind the inclusion of the fourth amend-
ment.101 As noted by the House of Commons in its debate on general
warrants:
Even a particular warrant to seize seditious papers alone, without
mentioning the titles of them, may prove highly detrimental, since in
that case, all a man's papers must be indiscriminately examined, and
such examination may bring things to light which it may not concern
the public to know, and which yet it may prove highly detrimental to
the owner to have made public .... 102
The search for private papers, even those particularly described in a warrant,
necessarily involves "rummaging" through the contents of all the personal pa-
pers to isolate those subject to seizure.10 3 A private papers search, even if
limited by the particularity clause of the fourth amendment, still must partake
of some of the same general characteristics and dangers of the general warrant.
Although a search for tangible physical items may involve some "rum-
maging," it does not necessitate the same degree of searching as required in a
search for particular papers. As one scholar has observed, "documentary
those involved in professional confidential relationships. See Privacy Protection Act of 1980, 42
U.S.C.A. §§ 2000aa-l Ito -12 (West Supp. 1980). However, under the Act a federal officer's fail-
ure to comply with the Attorney General's guidelines is not an issue which may be litigated, nor
may it be used to invoke the exclusionary rule.
99. Id. at 581-82 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
100. Justice Stewart noted in Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring),
that "[tihe standard of reasonableness embodied in the Fourth Amendment demands that the
showing of justification match the degree of intrusion." Id. at 69. In Zurcher, Justice Powell
commented that the Court's opinion makes clear that "the magistrate must judge the reasonable-
ness of every warrant in light of the circumstances of the particular case, carefully considering the
description of the evidence sought, the situation of the premises, and the position and interest of
the owner or occupant." 436 U.S. at 570 (Powell, J., concurring). In a footnote Justice Powell
noted that the magnitude of the search together with the nature and significance of the material
sought are also factors that properly must be considered as bearing on the reasonableness of the
search and the particularity requirement of the fourth amendment. Id. at 570 n.2.
101. For historical development, see books cited at note 4 supra.
102. 16 ParL Hist. Eng. 10 (1765).
103. As Learned Hand noted, "the real evil aimed at by the Fourth Amendment is the search
itself, that invasion of a man's privacy which consists in rummaging about among his effects to
secure evidence against him." United States v. Poller, 43 F.2d 911, 914 (2d Cir. 1930).
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searches involve deeper inroads on personal security than searches for the
traditional fruits and instrumentalities of crime."' 1 4
Justice Blackmun, in.Andresen, acknowledged the grave danger inherent
in executing a warrant authorizing the search of a person's papers and noted
that the same risks are not necessarily present in the search for physical objects
whose relevancy is easily ascertainable. 10 5 But after stating that similar dan-
gers are present in executing a warrant for the seizure of telephone conversa-
tions, he felt it sufficient merely to warn the responsible judicial officials that
they must take care to assure that both kinds of searches are conducted in a
manner that minimizes the unwarranted intrusion upon privacy.'
0 6
In Boyd, the Court held that all government attempts to secure an indi-
vidual's private papers by subpoena or search are unconstitutional under both
the fifth amendment self-incrimination clause and the reasonableness clause of
the fourth amendment.'0 7 The Boyd Court concluded that the intimate rela-
tionship linking these two amendments created a barrier between the govern-
ment and the individual's inviolate property rights in the privacy of his books
and papers such that the search and seizure of his private papers would be
"unreasonable" even if conducted pursuant to subpoena or a warrant satisfy-
ing the procedural requirements of the fourth amendment.' 08 The central is-
sue that the majority of the Court has refused to address in the post-Katz cases
dealing with the government's obtaining private papers is the wisdom and
practicality of maintaining a "private enclave" of individual privacy as a "fun-
damental value" protected by these amendments.' 09 As a commentator has
noted, "The conclusion that the fourth and fifth amendments should protect
absolutely a core of one's expressions and effects is impelled by the moral and
symbolic need to recognize and defend the private aspect of personality."
' "0
Just as the Court has resisted attempts by the legislative branch to control
private behavior,"' a continued recognition of the fundamental value of an
absolute privacy protection to purely "personal documents" such as diaries
and private papers 12 justifies a return to Boyd's creative intertwining of the
104. Taylor, supra note 4, at 68. As stated in State v. Bisaccia, 45 N.J. 504, 515, 213 A.2d 185,
191 (1965), "even a search for a specific, identified paper may involve the same rude intrusion [of
a general search] if the quest for it leads to an examination of all of a man's private papers." See
McKenna, supra note 42, at 69, where he suggests that an additional consideration relating to the
search of private papers is not merely its highly intrusive nature in fourth amendment terms but
the values protected by the first amendment and the generalized right of privacy.
105. 427 U.S. at 482 n.1l.
106. Id.
107. 116 U.S. at 633.
108. Id. at 630. See Note, supra note 49; Note, supra note 48.
109. See Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1963); Note, supra note 49, at 986
n.246. See generally Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890).
110. Note, supra note 49, at 985.
111. Id. at 986 n.249.
112. Justice Brandeis, in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478-79 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting), observed that this recognition is the core of the fourth amendment.
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the pur-
suit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feel-
ings and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and
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fourth and fifth amendments to protect "the sanctity of a man's home and the
privacies of life."' 1 3 Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, in their elo-
quent article on privacy, acknowledged that "ft]he common law secures to
each individual the right of determining, ordinarily, to what extent his
thoughts, sentiments and emotions shall be communicated to others... and
even if he has chosen to give them expression, he generally retains the power
to fix the limits of the publicity which shall be given them."' 14
MISPLACED CONFIDENCES: THE RIGHT TO CONVERSATIONAL PRIVACY
The fourth amendment exists to protect "the people"--criminals and
non-criminals alike-from government overreaching and intrusion into their
privacy. The amendment addresses its limits to the government and, thus, the
proper analytical framework for determining when a particular police practice
is to go unregulated by constitutional restraints must be based upon the nature
of the police activities and their relationship to the amendment's broad privacy
coverage.
To consider the "reasonableness" of privacy expectations from the crimi-
nal perspective can only seriously weaken the Katz privacy analysis. The ulti-
mate question, whether "the amount of privacy and freedom remaining to
citizens would be diminished to a compass inconsistent with the aims of a free
and open society," ' s must not be guided by any theory of "risk assumption"
or "subjective privacy expectation" that a criminal may possess. This perspec-
tive, however, is precisely the analytical framework that has dominated the
Court's analysis in the "misplaced confidences" cases.
The "misplaced confidence" seed was planted by the Court in Lewis v.
United States, 1 6 flowered in Hoffa v. United StatesM7 and came to full frui-
tion in United States v. White." 8 In this area the Court has declined to impose
restraints on the government's use of its secret agents or informants. In fact, it
has broadened and diversified the applicable situations of this "misplaced
doctrine.""19
satisfaction of life are to be found in material things. They sought to protect Americans
in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as
against the Government, the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and
the right most valued by civilized men. To protect that right, every unjustifiable intru-
sion by the Government upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means em-
ployed, must be deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Id. at 478.
By failing to recognize the paramount nature of the fourth and fifth amendment privacy
values, the Court, inAndresen, serves "to confine the dominion of privacy to the mind." 427 U.S.
463, 487 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
113. 116 U.S. at 630.
114. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 109, at 198.
115. Amsterdam, supra note 7, at 403.
116. 385 U.S. 206 (1966).
117. 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
118. 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
119. See, e.g., Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 (1977) (An undercover agent who had
been "arrested" with Bursey was asked by the defense to attend pretrial strategy meetings. He did
not reveal his true identity as a federal agent and at the trial, over the objection of Bursey's sixth
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In Lewis, a federal narcotics agent, misrepresenting his identity, tele-
phoned Lewis and asked him about the possibility of purchasing narcotics. He
was invited to Lewis' home, where, after a brief conversation, an unlawful
narcotics transaction took place. At trial Lewis objected to the admission of
the agent's testimony about what had occurred at the home regarding the nar-
cotics sale, claiming that absent a warrant, the agent's intrusion upon the pri-
vacy of his home constituted a fourth amendment violation. Furthermore, he
claimed that the fact that he may have invited the agent could not be consid-
ered a waiver of his rights because the invitation was induced by the agent's
fraud and deception.
120
Chief Justice Warren, expressing the view of the majority, determined
that Lewis' invitation to the agent to participate in an illegal commercial activ-
ity at his home did in fact constitute a limited waiver of his fourth amendment
rights. The agent, having entered upon invitation for that specific and limited
purpose, had heard, seen and taken only what was necessary for the illegal
sale, thereby enabling the Chief Justice to conclude that "[t]he pretense re-
sulted in no breach of privacy; it merely encouraged [Lewis] to say things
which he was willing and anxious to say to anyone who would be interested in
purchasing marihuana." 121
The Lewis "misplaced confidence" rationale was extended in Hoffa v.
United States,12 2 a case decided during the same term. Teamster President
James Hoffa was tried in Nashville, Tennessee for violating a criminal provi-
sion of the Taft-Hartley Act. That trial, referred to as the "Test Fleet Trial,"
ended in a hung jury. Hoffa and three of his associates subsequently were
convicted for endeavoring to bribe members of the Test Fleet jury.123 The
Government obtained much of the evidence enabling those convictions from
Edward Partin, a Teamster local official and an associate of Hoffa.
According to the facts as assumed by the Court, Partin, who had been in
prison on state charges and under federal indictment for embezzling union
funds, was released on bail and by means of his long-time association with
Hoffa, was able to insinuate himself into Hoffa's entourage. 124 As a "faithful"
and fourteenth amendment claims, the agent was allowed to testify for the prosecution regarding
matters occurring prior to the arrest.). See also United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741 (1979),
discussed at note 145 infra. But see United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264 (1980), discussed at notes
149-158 and accompanying text infra.
120. 385 U.S. at 208.
121. Id. at 212 (quoting from respondent's brief). The Court distinguished the facts in Lewis
where the agent did not exceed the bounds of his invitation, from those in Gouled v. United
States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921), where the "friend," acting under the orders of federal agents, was
allowed to enter the petitioner's office for the limited purpose of a social visit and then secretly
ransacked the office and seized incriminating papers. 385 U.S. at 209-10. In Gouled, the Court
held that the materials were unconstitutionally seized in that the government should have secured
a warrant before searching the premises. 255 U.S. at 309.
122. 385 U.S. 293 (1966). For a perceptive discussion of Hofa, see Kitch, supra note 27, at
150-53.
123. Petitioners Hoffa, Parks and Campbell were convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (1964)
which made attempting to influence or injure a juror a crime.
124. For the purposes of deciding the constitutional issues, the Court assumed that Partin was
in fact a government informer from the time he first arrived in Nashville. 385 U.S. at 299.
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servant of Hoffa's defense camp during the Test Fleet case, he was in a posi-
tion to overhear conversations, many of which were between Hoffa and his
attorneys and prospective defense witnesses. Pursuant to the general instruc-
tions he received from the federal government, Partin reported everything he
saw and heard, much of which he ultimately testified to at Hoffa's bribery
trial.
Hoffa's fourth amendment claim was that the incriminating admissions
overheard by Partin, a government agent placed in Hoffa's hotel suite, resulted
from unlawful invasions of Hoffa's privacy in his hotel room and of the secur-
ity of his communications.
The Hoffa Court initially reaffirmed that fourth amendment protections
are not linked solely to tangibles but can extend to oral statements, and that
fourth amendment privacy certainly can be violated by deception 125 as well as
by forcible intrusions into a constitutionally protected area such as a hotel
room. The Court, however, rejected Hoffa's claim and determined that "mis-
placed confidences," disclosed in front of his friend and close associate Partin,
were not protected by the fourth amendment.'1 6 In analyzing Hoffa's claim,
the Court reasoned that Hoffa's argument fell on "its misapprehension of the
fundamental nature and scope of Fourth Amendment protection."' 127 The
fourth amendment, which protects "the security a man relies upon when he
places himself or his property in a constitutionally protected area," did not
provide a safeguard for Hoffa, because he did not rely on the security of the
hotel room but rather on his "misplaced confidence" in his friend Partin.
128
The Court thereby concluded that the fourth amendment does not protect "a
wrongdoer's misplaced belief that a person to whom he voluntarily confides
his wrongdoing will not reveal it.' ' 129 In fact, the Hoffa Court reasoned, being
betrayed by an informer or deceived as to an informer's identity is "probably
inherent" in the condition of human society and is a risk necessarily assumed
whenever one speaks.
130
By its characterization as a "misplaced confidence" case, Hoffa was di-
rectly assimilated into Lewis without addressing the fundamental distinctions
between the two decisions. Lewis' contention that the agent's deception in-
vaded his privacy was rejected because Lewis had invited the agent into his
home for the specific purpose of making the unlawful sale, and in fact the
agent did not see, hear or take anything that was not contemplated by the
illegal transaction.131 Lewis was a very limited and specific intrusion. By
comparison, Partin's intrusion was more extensive. Once admitted to Hoffa's
entourage, Partin was privileged to conversations, both as directed to him and
125. Id. at 301 (citing Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961), and Gouled v. United
States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921)).
126. 385 U.S. at 301-02.
127. Id. at 301.
128. Id. at 301-03.
129. Id. at 302.
130. Id. at 303.
131. Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. at 210.
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as between Hoffa and his attorney and other witnesses. Partin was "the
equivalent of a bugging device" which moved with Hoffa. 132 Chief Justice
Warren, the author of the majority opinion in Lewis, was clearly repulsed by
the "unconscionable activities" in Hoffa, and in a separate dissent attacked the
government's actions of procuring and using the unreliable informer in this
manner as an "affront to the quality and fairness of federal law enforcement"
and as an instance deserving of the exercise of the Court's supervisory
powers. 133
An additional critical distinction, and a very compelling one, was that
unlike the agent in Lewis, who was invited into the home to conduct the un-
lawful sale, Hoffa had not opened his hotel suite for the transaction of any
business. The Court reasoned, however, that Hoffa was not relying on the
security of the hotel room but upon his misplaced confidence in his friend
Partin. The Court dropped a cryptic footnote, hinting that if Partin had been a
stranger to Hoffa, as was the agent in Lewis, the result might have been differ-
ent.134 The Court seemed to suggest that if Partin had been a secret agent who
wormed his way into Hoffa's confidence, the degree of government deception
would be greater and that this would not be a risk that Hoffa need assume.
But there are no constitutional policy considerations regarding privacy inter-
ests that would support this suggestion. The government's deception and pri-
vacy intrusion is not any different, regardless of the prior relationship between
Hoffa and Partin, for the informer was, the Court assumed, working for the
government at the moment he made initial contact with Hoffa in Nashville.
135
Partin was not a friend who later revealed wrongdoing to the government-a
risk that all friends must take-but was recruited by the government to secure
admittance to Hoffa's secret councils for the very purpose of reporting every-
thing to the government. 136 Partin's actions from the beginning were the
equivalent of the government's creating a risk that Hoffa neither assumed nor,
in the Katz parlance, "reasonably expected."
137
The Hoffa Court's main argument was based upon the premise that
whenever one speaks it is possible that he will be overheard by an eavesdrop-
per, or that the person to whom he is speaking may have misrepresented his
identity or will not maintain the confidentiality of the conversation. These
132. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. at 319 (Warren, C.J., dissenting). But unlike a bugging
device that accurately relates the overheard conversation, Partin was viewed by the Chief Justice
as a ' ailbird" and the type of informer who poses "a serious potential for undermining the integ-
rity of the truth-finding process in the federal courts." Id. at 320.
133. Id.
134. The Court stated, "The applicability of the Fourth Amendment if Partin had been a
stranger to the petitioner is a question we do not decide. Cf. Lewis v. United States." Id. at 302
n.6.
135. See note 124 supra.
136. "[A] person may take the risk that a friend will turn on him and report to the police. But
that is far different from the Government's 'planting' a friend in a person's entourage so that he
can secure incriminating evidence." Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 347 (1966) (Douglas,
J., dissenting). Cf. Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 306 (1921) (government intrusion by
stealth or social acquaintance is prohibited by the fourth amendment as an intrusion by force).
137. See Kitch, supra note 27, at 150-51.
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risks, the Court concluded, are incidental to life in a conversational society. 138
But this argument is specious as applied to government agents. The risk of
betrayal by one's friends who may later relate wrongdoing to the government
cannot be regulated by the fourth's safeguards, but the fourth amendment can
and does regulate government actions, especially by its agents. The govern-
ment has significantly altered the perceived risks by purposefully introducing
spies into the home and other protected areas. 139 Furthermore, the focus of
the analysis is incorrect. Rather than asking whether criminal confederates
must assume certain risks, the question should be whether this is the type of
governmental intrusion into the privacy rights of citizens of a free society that
should be allowed to occur without procedural safeguards. The Court makes
no concession to our collective security, criminal and innocent alike, seeming
to reason that since ordinary social intercourse imposes certain risks, "the gov-
ernment is constitutionally unconstrained in adding to those risks."'
140
The compatibility of the privacy doctrine formulated in Katz, with the
authority of law enforcement officials to electronically equip their secret
agents with bugging devices without the benefit of a warrant was tested in
United States v. White. 141 White's conversations with an informer, concerning
the sale of heroin, took place in both White's and the informer's homes and in
the informer's car. 142 These conversations were monitored by means of a min-
iature radio transmitter, concealed on the informer, which enabled federal
narcotics agents to overhear the conversations. The prosecution was unable to
locate the informer at the time of the trial, but the incriminating exchanges
were related by the federal agents at trial as direct evidence of White's guilt.
The White Court conceded that Katz reconstructed the scope of fourth
amendment protection and cut the amendment free from the necessity of a
physical intrusion requirement, but in the process the Court recognized that
Katz itself never provided a meaningful key to the nature of the privacy to be
protected. 143 The White opinion is posited on the risk assumption approach
postulated in Hoffa, with only passing reference to White's privacy expecta-
tions. 4 The White Court reasoned, as had the Hoffa Court, that the fourth
amendment does not protect the individual from "misplaced confidences" in a
friend-turned-informer, and concluded that the fourth need not protect him
138. 385 U.S. at 303.
139. See Stone, The Scope of the Fourth Amendment: Privacy and the Police Use of Spies,
Secret Agents, and Informers, 1976 Am. B. Foundation Research J. 1193, 1240.
140. Amsterdam, supra note 7, at 406. Justice Harlan was disturbed that widespread partici-
pant monitoring "might well smother that spontaneity-reflected in frivolous, impetuous, sacrile-
gious, and defiant discourse-that liberates daily life." United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 787
(1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting). See note 136 supra.
141. 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
142. Four of the conversations took place in the informer's home and were overheard by an
agent hiding in the closet and by another agent who was stationed outside and heard the conversa-
tion via a radio receiver. Four other conversations were overheard through the use of radio equip-
ment: one in a restaurant, two in the informer's car and the last at White's home. Id. at 747.
143. Justice White indicated that the question remaining after Katz was what privacy expecta-
tions are "constitutionally justifiable'-what expectations the Fourth Amendment will protect in
the absence of a warrant." Id. at 752. See Amsterdam, supra note 7, at 357-58.
144. 401 U.S. at 751-52.
[Vol. 60
PR!VMCGYAND STANDING
when the same informant has recorded or simultaneously transmitted the con-
versations to the government. 145 To capsulate White's theory: Since an indi-
vidual must assume the risk of betrayal by his friends, he must now also run
the risk that the government will foist upon him in the privacy of his home
secret agents in the guise of friends, equipped with bugging devices. 146 Recast
in the Katz privacy-expectation orientation: Since an individual contemplat-
ing illegal activity must realize the risk that his companions may be reporting
to the police, this revelation to the government by the informer does not in-
vade the criminal's justifiable expectations of privacy and neither does the si-
multaneous recording or transmission of this conversation. 147
Therefore, where Hoffa gave the government constitutional permission to
use its secret agents as a passport to intrude upon a suspect's privacy, White
increased the privacy invasion by extending authority to the government,
without a warrant, to monitor its agents electronically. This judicially un-
supervised privacy invasion is difficult to reconcile with Katz's promised prin-
ciples of protected constitutional privacies.148
The majority of the Court, however, has refused to apply the "misplaced
confidence" rationale to the government's use of an undercover informant
who "deliberately elicits" incriminating statements from an accused after for-
mal criminal proceedings have commenced. In United States v. Henry,149 a
paid government informant confined in the same jail cell block as the defend-
ant Henry, "stimulated" conversations with him regarding the defendant's
bank robbery charges. Although the informant was instructed by a govern-
ment agent not to question Henry but merely to be alert to any statements
made by federal prisoners, the Court had little difficulty in finding that the
agent must have known that the informant, who was paid on a "contingent fee
basis," would "deliberately elicit" incriminating statements.' 50
The Henry Court determined that Massiah v. United States,Is I apre-mis-
placed confidence case, directly controlled its decision.152 By relying on the
fassiah doctrine that once formal criminal proceedings have begun any sur-
reptitious questioning by an undercover agent intended to elicit incriminating
145. The Court perceived no difference between the privacy invasion of a secret recording and
that of a friend-turned-State's-evidence. In United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 750 (1979), the
Court reaffirmed White in holding that an I.R.S. agent's consent to have his conversation with a
taxpayer recorded vitiated any invasion on the taxpayer's privacy since he assumed the risk that
the agent would not keep their conversation private. But Justice Marshall, in dissent, recognized
that the use of electronic devices in violation of I.R.S. regulations may undercut privacy and
security interests. Id. at 760 (Marshall, J., dissenting). But cf. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 63
(1967) (White, J., dissenting) (electronic eavesdropping is serious risk to privacy and security);
Alaska v. Glass, 583 P.2d 872, 877 (Alaska 1978) (difference between assuming risk of a gossip and
being recorded).
146. 401 U.S. at 777 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
147. Id. at 752-53.
148. See Comment, Electronic Eavesdropping and the Right to Privacy, 52 B.U.L. Rev. 831
(1972).
149. 447 U.S. 264 (1980).
150. Id. at 270-71.
151. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
152. 447 U.S. at 270.
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statements impermissibly interferes with the accused's sixth amendment right
to counsel, 153 the Henry Court concluded that defendant Henry's statement to
the informant should not have been admitted at trial.
154
Chief Justice Burger, for the majority Court, determined, although his
reasons for so doing are not readily apparent,15 5 that there is a substantial
difference in the use of secret informers in investigating a crime prior to, as in
Hoffa, as opposed to after, as in Henry, formal proceedings have com-
menced. 156 He noted that in Hoffa, no legitimate interest protected by the
fourth was involved, because "'the Fourth Amendment [does not protect] a
wrongdoer's misplaced belief that a person to whom he voluntarily confides
his wrongdoing will not reveal it.' ,157 But once the formal proceedings have
begun, the use of secret informers to elicit deliberately incriminatory remarks
impermissibly interferes with the accused's sixth amendment right to counsel.
Henry, by directly reaffirming the Hoffa- White misplaced confidence doc-
trine,158 creates a paradox, since during a continuing covert operation the gov-
ernment initially is unconstrained by the fourth's procedural safeguards in its
use of a government informant masquerading as a friend who secretly listens
to or bugs conversations. Once formal criminal proceedings have begun, how-
ever, any further dealings an individual has with the informant are absolutely
protected by the sixth amendment. In Harris v. United States,159 Justice
Frankfurter counseled that "[a] decision [of a Fourth Amendment claim] may
turn on whether one gives that Amendment a place second to none in the Bill
of Rights, or considers it on the whole a kind of nuisance, a serious impedi-
ment in the war against crime."' 60 The Surpeme Court's disillusionment with
the exclusionary doctrine has placed the fourth in a disfavored position.
The Court has not applied the same analytical analysis in business
searches that it has used with spies infiltrating the inner circle of criminals.
For example, in Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc. 161 the Court held that Occupational
Safety and Health Act (OSHA) agents need a warrant to search work areas for
safety hazards whenever the owner of the establishment refuses consent to the
safety inspection. The Court determined that although an employee is free to
report violations he observes, and the government is free to use any of this
evidence, the government's scrutiny may go no further without a warrant. The
employer's privacy in conducting his business is not lost because he must use
employees; nor, apparently, must he assume the risk that the government will
153. 377 U.S. at 205-06.
154. 447 U.S. at 274.
155. Id. at 299 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
156. Id. at 272.
157. Id. (quoting Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. at 302). Chief Justice Burger also stated
that prior to the filing of charges against the defendant, the fifth amendment may not be invoked
against the use of undercover agents since the potentiality for compulsion was absent. Id.
158. Id. at 272.
159. 331 U.S. 145 (1947).
160. Id. at 157 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
161. 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
[Vol. 60
P! VA CY AND ST4NDING
thrust upon him an employee spy. 162
The Court assuredly would not weaken its ruling that OSHA agents must
utilize the administrative warrant procedure by permitting OSHA easily to
circumvent the procedure by the use of an undercover employee planted in the
business free to observe or transmit pictures back to OSHA agents, on the
Hoffa- White risk-assumption approach. 163 The Barlow decision demonstrates
that the employer need not assume any greater risk vis-A-vis the government
than that which is apparent objectively under the circumstances. 164 That the
Court is prepared to limit the risk the businessman must assume regarding
government activity is exemplified further by Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York,
165
in which Chief Justice Burger determined that although a business establish-
ment opens its doors to the public, it still maintains privacy expectations
against government intrusion. The risk that befalls the public business, in this
case an adult bookstore, is minimal; it is that the government will view the
magazines and films as would any other member of the public and that any
additional government intrusion must conform to fourth amendment
safeguards. 1
66
In United States v. White, 167 the Court's analytical perspective was based
upon the subjective expectations and assumed risks that a criminal has taken
and must take in speaking to confederates. In contrast, Justice Harlan altered
his subjective conception announced in Katz168 and recognized that any pri-
vacy analysis must "transcend the search for subjective expectations or legal
attribution of assumptions of risk." 169 The protection the fourth amendment
provides to "all the people" should not be based on any imposed risk assump-
tions or privacy expectations of criminals. Rather, the analysis should be
grounded upon a consideration of whether our sense of security, characteristic
of individual relationships among citizens of a free society, is undermined by
the practice of uncontrolled informer electronic bugging.170 By molding its
"risk analysis" theory exclusively in terms of the expectations and risks that
wrongdoers involved in illegal activities ought to bear, the White Court im-
162. Id. at 315.
163. See Grano, Perplexing Questions About Three Basic Fourth Amendment Issues: Fourth
Amendment Activity, Probable Cause, and the Warrant Requirement, 69 J. Crim. L. & Criminol-
ogy 425, 435 (1978).
164. Id. at 436.
165. 442 U.S. 319 (1979). In Lo-Ji, officers searched an adult bookstore and seized massive
amounts of materials. The warrant on which they had acted was defective in that it had not been
issued by a detached and neutral magistrate and was too open-ended. Id. at 326-27. The evidence
seized therefore was held to be inadmissable at trial Id. at 329.
166. Id. at 329.
167. 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
168. In Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Katz, he stated that the fourth amendment
protects one who has "exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the
expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.'" 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967)
(Harlan, J., concurring).
169. 401 U.S. at 786 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
170. Justice Harlan noted that frequently the laws of the land become the customs and expec-
tations of its people, and that therefore the Court must consider the societal influence of lax laws
condoning electronic eavesdropping. Id. See Comment, supra note 148.
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posed on all citizens the risk of electronic bugging without any fourth amend-
ment safeguards.'
71
To the individual whose conversation is monitored, the privacy invasion
is the same whether the government agent electronically monitors the conver-
sation directly or does so surreptitiously through a secret agent. All citizens,
especially those in fringe groups who believe their lawful but unpopular activi-
ties may make them objects of government scrutiny, take little solace in the
knowledge that the government may not, without sufficient reason or close
judicial supervision, directly monitor their actions electronically but may,
without any cause or judicial control plant spies in their midst to gain the same
information. 172 As a doctrinal matter, it is unquestioned that Katz was in-
tended to broaden the boundaries of fourth amendment protection, but by
using the criminal as the risk assumption model and by imposing upon him a
required expectation of such risk, these boundaries are restricted for all citi-
zens, thus jeopardizing the "people's sense of security" that is, after all, the
fundamental concern of the fourth amendment.
173
REQUIRED CONFIDENCES
In 1970, Congress enacted the Bank Secrecy Act, 174 which authorized the
Secretary of the Treasury to require financial institutions to maintain dupli-
cate records of bank transactions with their customers. The Act was based on
the premise that an effective fight against crime depends in large measure on
the maintenance of adequate and appropriate records by financial institu-
tions.' 75 Both the House Committee on Banking and Currency and the Senate
Banking Committee noted that access to the records must be controlled, the
latter stating that "[t]he legislation in no way authorizes unlimited fishing ex-
peditions into a bank's records on the part of law enforcement officials,"'
176
and insisting that the records could only be obtained through existing legal
process.
In United States v. Miller, 77 a bank customer moved to suppress copies
171. 401 U.S. at 789 (Harlan, J., dissenting). See Holmes v. Burr, 486 F.2d 55 (9th Cir.) (Huf-
stedler, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1116 (1973). Justice Hufstedler stated,
What is left of anyone's justifiable reliance on privacy. . . if everyone must realize that
he will be free from warrantless electronic intrusion only so long as someone in the
government does not suspect him of improper conduct or wrong thinking? . ..Adop-
tion of the assumption of the risk theory ultimately rests on the cynical conclusion that a
warrantless search is justified by what it reveals.
Id. at 72.
172. Professor Amsterdam has noted that "under electronic surveillance you are afraid to talk
to anybody in your office or over the phone, while under the spy system you are afraid to talk to
anybody at all." Amsterdam, supra note 7, at 407.
173. See Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 354 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("If a
man's privacy can be invaded at will, who can say he is free?").
174. Bank Secrecy Act of October 26, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114 (codified at 12
U.S.C. §§ 1951-59 (1980)).
175. H.R. Rep. No. 975, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1970).
176. S. Rep. No. 1139, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1970).
177. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
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of microfilm records of his financial transactions that were maintained by the
bank pursuant to the Bank Secrecy Act. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
noted that although the constitutionality of the record keeping requirement of
the Bank Secrecy Act was upheld in California Bankers Association v.
Shultz, 178 the Supreme Court had clearly stated that access to the records
would be controlled, in accord with Congressional intent, by existing legal
process.179 The appeals court assumed that Miller had the necessary fourth
amendment interest, based upon the Supreme Court's ruling in United States
v. Boyd,180 which had prohibited the "compulsory production of a man's pri-
vate papers to establish a criminal charge against him."181 The court further
posited that "the government may not cavalierly circumvent Boyd's precious
protection by first requiring a third party bank to copy all of its depositors'
personal checks and then, with an improper invocation of legal process, calling
upon the bank to allow inspection and reproduction of those copies."
182
The broad fourth amendment protections developed in Katz, shearing
privacy from its traditional, narrow, property-related base, were undermined
by the Supreme Court's decision in Miller.18 3 Justice Powell, for the majority,
concluded that the bank depositor had no protectible fourth amendment inter-
est in the bank records maintained by the bank in compliance with the Bank
Secrecy Act, and dismissed Miller's contention that because the federal agent
had obtained the records from the bank through the use of a defective sub-
poena duces tecum,184 his fourth amendment rights were violated. The Court
asserted that the microfilm records were the bank's and, unlike Boyd, Miller
was unable to claim either ownership or possession of them.185 Further, the
Court reasoned that even if
attention [is directed] to the original checks and deposit slips, rather
than to the microfilm copies actually viewed and obtained by means
of the subpoena, [the bank depositor had] no legitimate expectation
of privacy in their contents, [since they are negotiable instruments
which the customer] voluntarily conveyed to the bank and exposed to
178. 416 U.S. 21 (1974). The Court held that the required maintenance of records of custom-
ers' transactions did not violate the fourth amendment rights of depositors since the acquisition of
bank records by the government was still controlled by existing legal process. Id. at 52.
179. 500 F.2d 751, 757-58 (5th Cir. 1974).
180. 116 U.S. 616 (1886). See notes 43-48 and accompanying text supra.
181. 500 F.2d at 757 (quoting Boyd, 116 U.S. at 622).
182. 500 F.2d at 757. Especially important in the "required documents" cases is the fact that it
is the third-party institution which has the burden of deciding whether to prevent an invasion of
the citizen's rights or to comply with governmental directives. Certainly the protection provided
the citizen is considerably less than when he is directly in contact with the government's demands.
See Comment, Government Access to Bank Records, 83 Yale L.J. 1439 (1974).
183. Accord, Pray, A Bank Customer Has No Reasonable Expectation of Privacy of Bank
Records: United States v. Miller, 14 San Diego L. Rev. 414, 427 (1977). ("A property rights
rationale may be one explanation of the possession requirement"). See 1 W. LaFave, supra note
51, § 2.7, at 412.
184. Miller claimed that the subpoenas were defective because they were not issued by a court,
the date for their return was a time when the grand jury was not in session, and in fact they were
not returned to the court. 425 U.S. at 438-39.
185. Id. at 440.
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their employees in the ordinary course of business.'8 6
The Court then applied the risk assumption analysis it had developed in
Hoffa, 187 and concluded that the depositor, even if he reveals information on
the assumption that it will be used for a limited purpose, takes the risk in
revealing his affairs to another that the information will be conveyed by that
person to the government.
188
In the Boyd decision, the Court held that all government attempts, even
by warrants or subpoenas, to procure a person's private papers are unconstitu-
tional under both the fourth and fifth amendments.' 8 9 The Boyd Court rea-
soned that "any forcible and compulsory extortion of a man's own testimony
or of his private papers to be used as evidence to convict him of crime"'190 is
condemned by the fourth amendment as unreasonable and runs afoul of the
self-incrimination clause of the fifth amendment. "In this regard the Fourth
and Fifth Amendments run almost into each other." 191 The Boyd Court
thereby established an absolutist approach to an individual's private papers,
proceeding from the premise that the property interest in maintaining the pri-
vacy of an individual's papers are the very essence of constitutional liberty and
security.
This view, which restricted the government from obtaining private docu-
ments, no longer commands any authority,192 although no search can be made
and no subpoena issued except in compliance with the requirements of the
fourth amendment. Although traditionally linked with property concepts, the
fourth amendment, as recognized in Katz, is designed to protect the individ-
ual's privacy interests from government abuse 193 and historically to protect the
individual from the government's use of the dreaded writs of assistance and
general search warrants.194 By these yardsticks, Miller fails because it toler-
ates as a necessary incident of criminal law enforcement an abridgment of
personal privacy. The Court's conclusion that there is no protected fourth
amendment privacy interest in the depositor's records because the depositor is
neither owner nor possessor of the microfilm is contrary to Katz's revised con-
ceptual basis for determining the existence of a fourth amendment interest. 195
186. Id. at 442.
187. 385 U.S. 293 (1966). See text accompanying notes 138-40 supra.
188. 425 U.S. at 443.
189. 116 U.S. at 634-38.
190. Id. at 630.
191. Id.
192. See, e.g., Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976) (warrant was issued to search busi-
ness premises and papers with self-incriminating statements were seized). Fisher v. United States,
425 U.S. 391 (1976) (taxpayer's attorney under subpoena required to relinquish workpapers pre-
pared by taxpayer's accountant); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973) (accountant, under
subpoena, forced to turn over private papers of client). See Note, supra note 49; Note, supra note
48.
193. 389 U.S. at 350. See Amsterdam, supra note 7, at 357.
194. 116 U.S. at 623-33. For historical development, see generally articles cited note 4 supra.
195. See O'Brien, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy: Principles and Policies of Fourth
Amendment-Protected Privacy, 13 New England L. Rev. 662 (1978) where the author observed
that "[t]he Court evaded its own privacy analysis by reemphasizing proprietary concepts and,
moreover, by failing to consider not only the value of such personal information per se, but also
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The Katz Court did not focus upon any property interest in the telephone
booth but, instead, held that Katz' fourth amendment rights depended upon
the existence of privacy upon which he justifiably relied. 196 The Katz Court
determined that constitutionally justified expectations of privacy are concep-
tually distinguishable from property concepts, and shifted primary emphasis
from property controlled concepts to privacy expectations.
1 97
Judicial determination respecting the boundaries ofjustifiable privacy ex-
pectation began after Katz. Although the lines continue to remain unclear, the
privacy interest protected by the fourth amendment seems to have nar-
rowed.'98 The desirability of protecting the multitude of privacy concerns in
its varied contexts remains a value judgment which undoubtedly will be differ-
ent for each Justice. Commenting on the constitutionality of the Bank Secrecy
Act in his dissent in California Bankers Association v. Shultz, 199 Justice Doug-
las concluded that bank accounts should be within the "expectation of pri-
vacy" protected by the fourth amendment because "they mirror not only one's
finances but his interests, his debts, his way of life, his family and his civic
commitments. ''2°° By denying Miller a fourth amendment interest, the Court
failed to conceptualize the privacy expectations appropriate to modern techno-
logical society as supported by both customary norms and societal interests.
The Court's reliance upon the "misplaced confidence" cases is also "mis-
placed." Even if Hoffa's and White's initial premise that a criminal must risk
that his associate is a government spy, perhaps electronically wired for sound,
is accepted, the manner by which the confidence was revealed and its nature is
significantly different in Miller. Unlike White, who can forego conversing
with a companion whose trustworthiness he doubts, Miller's disclosure of his
financial affairs is not entirely voluntary, since current economic reality makes
how access to that information may influence individuals' future activities and their expectations
of privacy." Id. at 736. Professor LaFave has noted that "Miller, by resorting to a 'proprietary
interest' interpretation which seemingly had been abandoned in Katz, fails to give protection to
information which surely deserves to be characterized as private." 1 W. LaFave, supra note 51,
§ 2.7, at 412.
196. 389 U.S. at 350-53.
197. Id. at 352-53.
198. One commentator has stated:
Subsequent cases indicate that legal protections remain severely curtailed by limita-
tions inherent in the reasonableness standard. These limitations still often turn on find-
ings of who possesses the allegedly private information or where the allegedly private act
occurred. The analytical transition which occurred between Olnstead and Katz may
therefore represent little more than abolition of technical trespass as per se determinative
of privacy protections.
Pray, supra note 183, at 422.
199. 416 U.S. 21 (1974).
200. Id. at 89 (Douglas, J., dissenting). In a concurring opinion, Justice Powell commented
that financial records can reveal much about a person's activities, associations and beliefs, and
that at some point, governmental intrusion upon these areas would implicate legitimate expecta-
tions of privacy. Id. at 78-79 (Powell, J., concurring). See also Burrows v. Superior Ct., 13 Cal. 3d
238, 247, 529 P.2d 590, 596, 118 Cal. Rptr. 166, 172 (1974), stating that "the totality of bank
records provides a virtual current biography [of the depositor].... to permit a police officer
access to these records.. . without any judicial control.. . opens the door to a vast and unlim-
ited range of very real abuses of police power."
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the maintenance of a bank account a virtual necessity.20 1 Therefore, Miller's
decision to utilize his bank's facilities cannot be said to be a voluntary waiver
of his privacy.
The extent of Miller's disclosure to the bank also differs from that in
White and Hoffa. Hoffa's and White's risks were limited to the incriminating
statements made in the presence of their false friends. The depositor's disclo-
sure to the bank is made for a very limited purpose-"that his check will be
examined for bank purposes only-to credit, debit or balance his account.
' '202
A bank employee sees a depositor's checks only briefly and not all at one time.
But now, under Miller, the depositor who for the privilege of enjoying his
account makes disclosures to the bank employee for the limited purpose of
facilitating the conduct of his financial affairs also risks that the government,
without any restraints, may gather information from the bank about all as-
pects of his personal affairs, opinions, habits and associations.
203
Increasingly, individuals are losing control over the scope and use of in-
formation they are required to divulge in order to function as effective mem-
bers of society. The desirability of protecting such information is ultimately a
201. See Burrows v. Superior Ct., 13 Cal. 3d at 247, 529 P.2d at 596, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 172.
202. California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. at 96 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Appropri-
ately, it has been observed that,
With the exception of a cursory inspection of the original item to insure that the check
is not postdated and that signatures and endorsements are genuine, bankers rarely have
any legitimate business use for the underlying transactional data ....
The increasing mechanization of the banking industry continues to reduce the
chances that any human agent would come into any direct, significant contact with the
underlying transactional information.
Comment, supra note 182, at 1463 n.114.
203. See Pray, supra note 183, at 425 ("Exposing the parts to sundry unrelated people is not
equivalent to exposing the whole to one's bank for limited business purposes."). See also 1 W.
LaFave, supra note 51, § 2.7, at 416. Congress minimally responded to the Court's pronounce-
ment of one's lack of a right to privacy in his bank records by passing the "Right to Financial
Privacy Act of 1978" as Title XI of the "Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate Con-
trol Act of 1978," Pub. L. No. 95-630, §§ 101-2101, 92 Stat. 3641-3741 (1978) (Title XI codified at
12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-22 (Supp. III 1979)), which applies only to customers who are individuals or
partnerships of five persons or less. The Act allows government access to financial records needed
in connection with a legitimate law enforcement inquiry, by subpoena, search warrant or formal
written requests by federal agencies which do not have administrative summons or subpoena pow-
ers. Under the latter category, the bank may refuse compliance. The customer must be given
notice of the fact that the government plans to review his records and he has the right to challenge
the action within 10 days before a court. Such notice is not required, however, if the government
shows that it would surely hamper the investigation. To sustain an objection to the government's
inquiry, the customer has the practically insurmountable burden of proving that government ac-
cess is not part of a "legitimate law enforcement inquiry," which is broadly defined, or that there
has not been substantial compliance with the Act. Additionally, the Act has enumerated impor-
tant exceptions to its mandates: grand jury subpoenas, when the customer and the government
agency are parties to a judicial or administrative proceeding, government secret service activities,
the Securities and Exchange Commission, as well as others. In effect, the burden on the customer,
both in filing fees and proving noncompliance by the government, is quite heavy. Additionally,
since the remedies of the Act are exclusive, it is possible that if the bank patron does not file his
objection, he will be barred from review at a later time. Instead of limiting government access to
bank records, it seems that Congress has increased the obstacles a customer must overcome before
he can claim a right to privacy. For an in-depth analysis of Congress' response to Miller, see
Kirschner, The Right toPinancial Privacy Act of 1978:--The Congressional Response to United
States . Miller: A Procedural Right to Challenge Government Access to Financial Records, 13
U. Mich. J.L. Ref. 10 (1979).
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value judgment whether this type of unregulated intrusion is of the kind that
we, as individuals in a free society, are willing to tolerate. The Miller Court
failed to entertain any analysis of the societal value in protecting privacy inter-
ests in bank accounts or the potential effect its decision may have in influenc-
ing the people's future dealings with banks.
2°4
In Smith v. Maryland,20 5 the Court used reasoning parallel to that applied
in Miller in determining that the government's use of a telephone company's
pen register device was not a "search" and furthermore was a risk that a tele-
phone subscriber must assume.206 Failing to acknowledge the "vital role that
the public telephone has come to play in private communication" 20 7 and the
lack of control an individual has over the telephone company's installation of
a pen register, the Court proclaimed that a subscriber "in all probability" en-
tertains no actual expectation of privacy in the phone numbers he dials and,
even if he did, his expectations are not "legitimate." 20 8 Therefore, the Court
determined that fourth amendment constitutional protections did not apply
because the privacy interest in a dialed phone number was not within Katz's
revised parameters of fourth amendment privacy.
Again, the Court's assumptions are faulty. A list of phone numbers di-
aled, like the microfilm bank records, may reveal the most intimate details of a
person's life and the government's unrestrained accessibility to this informa-
tion has a substantial impact upon the values which the fourth amendment
seeks to preserve.209 The degree of control an individual has over the collec-
tion and dissemination of this information is very limited; constitutional pro-
tections should not be abrogated whenever he must apprise third party
intermediaries of limited information for a restricted purpose necessary for his
everyday functioning in contemporary society.210 Although a telephone sub-
204. See O'Brien, supra note 195, at 736.
205. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
206. Id. at 743-45.
207. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 352.
208. 442 U.S. at 745. The Court concluded that the installation of the pen register did not
constitute a search. Id. at 745-46. The majority opinion appears to have bypassed the issue
whether or not obtaining the numbers constituted a "seizure" within the meaning bf the fourth
amendment. Justice Stewart, in dissent, hints that it may have been a seizure. He stated that
The information captured by such surveillance emanates from private conduct within a
person's home or office-locations that without question are entitled to Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendment protection. Further, that information is an integral part of the
telephonic communication that under Katz is entitled to constitutional protection,
whether or not it is captured by a trespass into such an area.
Id. at 747-48 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
209. Justice Stewart in dissent stated that the list of numbers obtained by the use of the pen
register "could reveal the identities of the persons and the places called, and thus reveal the most
intimate details of a person's life." Id. at 748 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
210. As Justice Marshall indicated, for allpractical purposes an individual has little choice in
deciding whether or not to use the telephone since such communications are essential in our tech-
nological culture. Therefore, he concluded that the risk assumption analysis was faulty. Id. at 750
(Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Stewart, in dissent, noted that for fourth amendment purposes,
the difference between the content of a telephone call and the list of numbers dialed into the
telephone is a difference in the degree, not the kind, of privacy invasion, for "[t]he numbers dialed
from a private telephone-although certainly more prosaic than the conversation itself--are not
without 'content.'" Id. at 748 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Furthermore, the law enforcement agency
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scriber or bank depositor is forced by the dictates of daily living to allow lim-
ited third party intrusions into his privacy, this is no basis for permitting
wholesale searches and seizures that do not conform to fourth amendment
guarantees.
211
Although the Court has used a risk assumption analysis in some cases
where the voluntariness of the disclosure is questionable at best, it has recently
negated the wholesale use of this doctrine as applied to a search of a public
business. In Marshall v. Barlow', Inc. ,212 the Court rejected the Govern-
ment's argument that the owner of a business, by the use of employees, throws
open to OSHA agents the warrantless scrutiny of areas that the employees
alone are permitted to enter. The Barlow Court recognized that an OSHA
agent stands in no better position than any other member of the public in
intruding on Barlow's privacy interest in running his business. Barlow, al-
though having had to utilize employees, still maintained vis-,A-vis the govern-
ment his full panoply of privacy rights. Also, in Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New
York,213 a unanimous Court reasoned that simply because an individual en-
gages in the open business of selling "adult" material to the public does not
mean that he has relinquished his privacy expectations against unlawful gov-
ernmental intrusions.2 14 It seems ironic that the Court provides greater pro-
tection to an individual who has voluntarily exposed himself to public scrutiny
while refusing to recognize the legitimate expectation of privacy of others who,
for all practical pruposes, have been compelled by modem technological de-
velopments to release information to a third party.
In Olmstead v. United States,215 Justice Brandeis, while condemning
wiretapping, aply observed that:
The progress of science in furnishing the Government with means of
espionage is not likely to stop with wire-tapping. . . .The makers of
our Constitution. . .conferred, as against the Government, the right
to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most
valued by civilized men. To protect that right, every unjustifiable
intrusion by the Government upon the privacy of the individual,
whatever the means employed, must be deemed a violation of the
examining bank or telephone records is viewing the records from a different perspective and with
a greater interest than that of the bank employee briefly viewing a depositor's check or the tele-
phone company using a pen register device for internal telephone business purposes. In Lo-Ji
Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319 (1979), dealing with the search and seizure of pornographic
books from a public bookstore, the Court noted that difference in roles does have an effect on how
one views the same material. The Court stated, "[In examining the books and in the manner of
viewing the containers in which the films were packaged for sale, [the Town Justice] was not
seeing them as a customer would ordinarily see them." Id. at 329.
211. As Justice Marshall stated in Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979), "[W]hether privacy
expectations are legitimate within the meaning of Katz depends not on the risks an individual can
be presumed to accept when imparting information to third parties, but on the risks he should be
forced to assume in a free and open society." Id. at 750 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
212. 436 U.S. 307 (1978). See text accompanying notes 161-64 supra.
213. 442 U.S. 319 (1979). See text accompanying note 165 supra.
214. Id. at 329.




The fourth amendment leaves room for the recognition and advancement
of technology in law enforcement, but unregulated access to customers' bank
records, as in Miller, and the use of the pen register device subject only to the
self-restraint of law enforcement officials, as in Smith, are at variance with the
fourth amendment's central theme of restraining the government from intrud-
ing too easily into "the people's lives." The Court failed to assess the effect
that this uncontrolled government activity will have on our daily living. Inter-
position of a warrant requirement or other sufficient safeguard is designed not
to shield the "wrongdoers" but to secure a measure of privacy and a sense of
personal security for all throughout our society.
PRIVACY EXPECTATIONS IN CARs: CONTAINERS
Police intrusions into automobiles have raised the difficult problem of try-
ing to reconcile the connection between the exigent circumstances presented
by many warrantless automobile searches and the core privacy interest sur-
rounding a motor vehicle. The effect of Katis privacy doctrine on vehicle
searches is best understood when viewed in the light of past decisions.
The "automobile exception" is a well-recognized exception to the warrant
requirement. The exception was first stated in Carroll v. United States,
217
which arose during the prohibition era when two bootleggers transporting
moonshine in their car were stopped on a highway outside of Detroit by fed-
eral prohibition agents patrolling the road. Detroit was a mecca for illegal
traffic in liquor, and the agents' past experience with these moonshiners led
them to believe that the men were presently engaged in transporting liquor.
2 18
Having stopped the car, the agents, without the benefit of a warrant, searched
it and found sixty-eight bottles of whiskey stashed under the seats and behind
the upholstery. The bootleggers were arrested and subsequently convicted of
violating the National Prohibition Act. Chief Justice Taft, after finding the
agents had "probable cause" to search the vehicle, concluded that:
[The guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures
by the Fourth Amendment has been construed, practically since the
beginning of the Government, as recognizing a necessary difference
between a search of a store, dwelling house or other structure in re-
spect of which a proper official warrant readily may be obtained, and
a search of a ship, motor boat, wagon or automobile, for contraband
goods, where it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the
vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in
216. Id. at 474-78 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
217. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
218. On a previous occasion, federal officers, acting as prospective purchasers, had made ar-
rangements with the two defendants to buy illegal alcohol At that time, they were able to see the
Oldsinobile which presumably would be used to transport the liquor from Canada. About a week
later they saw the defendants driving the car on a well known prohibition route. They attempted
to follow the vehicle but were unable to do so. About two months later, the federal agents spotted
the automobile moving westward from Detroit to Grand Rapids, an axis regularly used by boot-
leggers. It was on this day that the auto was stopped by the agents. Id. at 134-36.
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which the warrant must be sought.219
The Carroll doctrine therefore permits a car to be seized and searched without
a warrant if there are both "exigent circumstances" and "probable cause" to
believe that the car contains contraband.
The Carroll Court accepted the basic premise that the occupants of the
vehicle could not be arrested for a misdemeanor that was not committed in the
officer's presence,2 20 and therefore never considered the arrest of the occu-
pants and the immobilization of the car until a warrant was obtained as an
alternative to the warrantless search of the vehicle. Instead, the Court noted
that the validity of the seizure of the car and the right to search it were not
dependent upon the right to arrest the occupants, 22 1 thus clearly distinguishing
the newly announced "vehicle exception" from that of an automobile search
incident to the lawful arrest of the occupants.222
The Court did, however, clearly recognize that the seizure and search of
the vehicle infringed on the privacy interest of the "occupants" of the car
223
and placed several limitations on its new doctrine before noncompliance with
the warrant clause would be excused. The Court's primary concern was to
restrict the "vehicle exception" to its proper limits and emphatically stressed
that in "cases where the securing of a warrant is reasonably practicable, it
must be used."224 The Carroll Court viewed the facts as presenting a case
where the seizure of the vehicle was factually "impossible except without [a]
warrant." 225 At the same time, the Court emphasized that the officers had
"probable cause" to believe that the "moving vehicle" they "lawfully stopped"
on the highway contained contraband,226 and that it was "not practical" to
secure a search warrant for it because the car would have been moved quickly
out of the jurisdiction before the warrant could be obtained. Thus, although
Carroll based its new exception to the warrant requirement upon the impracti-
cability of obtaining a search warrant, it is readily apparent that the Court
really gave the police an option between an immediate "probable cause
search" of a moving vehicle lawfully stopped on the highway or the more
"burdensome" but surely not "impractical" seizure and immobilization of the
vehicle until a warrant is secured.
227
The Carroll "vehicle exception" was substantially expanded in Chambers
219. 267 U.S. at 153.
220. Id. at 156-58. See 2 W. LaFave, supra note 51, at 511.
221. 267 U.S. at 158-59.
222. For a discussion of search incident to a lawful arrest, see Chimel v. California, 395 U.S.
752 (1969), discussed at notes 277-81 and accompanying text infra.
223. Id. at 154.
224. Id. at 156.
225. Id. See 2 W. LaFave, supra note 51, § 7.2 at 510-14.
226. The Carroll decision is not limited only to searches for "contraband" since Warden v.
Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) has eradicated the "mere evidence" rule. See Note, Warrantless
Searches and Seizures of Automobiles, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 835, 839 n.24 (1974); 2 W. LaFave, supra
note 51, § 7.2, at 510-14.
227. See Note, supra note 226, at 845.
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v. Maroney,, 28 in which the Court validated a warrantless automobile search
that occurred after the car and its occupants were in police custody. Chambers
involved a late-night armed robbery of a gas station. The Supreme Court,
viewing the facts developed at the state trial, had no difficulty in establishing
that at the time the vehicle was stopped the police had "probable cause" to
believe that the car was being dxiven by the robbers and was carrying their
guns and the fruits of the crime. Furthermore, the officers had probable cause
to arrest the occupants of the station wagon and later, at the station house, to
make a search of the vehicle for guns and the stolen money. Thus, Chambers,
like Carroll, began with a moving vehicle, but the search took place after the
occupants' arrest while the car was immobilized in police custody. The de-
fense challenge was apparent: There are no exigent circumstances dispensing
with the warrant requirement and, therefore, the Carroll rationale for warrant-
less searches is not available. Justice White, for the Court, claimed otherwise:
Arguably, because of the preference for a magistrate's judgment,
only the immobilization of the car should be permitted until a search
warrant is obtained; arguably, only the "lesser" intrusion is permissi-
ble until the magistrate authorizes the "greater." But which is the
"greater" and which the "lesser" intrusion is itself a debatable ques-
tion and the answer may depend on a variety of circumstances. For
constitutional purposes, we see no difference between on the one
hand seizing and holding a car before presenting the probable cause
issue to the magistrate and on the other hand carrying out an imme-
diate search without a warrant. Given probable cause to search, ei-
ther course is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
229
Justice White then determined that since "[tihe probable-cause factor still ob-
tained at the station house and so did the mobility of the car," 30 the police
were permitted to search it at the station house without obtaining a warrant.
The Chambers decision clearly contradicts the Carroll admonition that a
warrant must be used where reasonably practical. The principal issue in
Chambers was whether to extend the immobilization of the car for the short
time needed by the police to obtain a warrant or whether to permit them to
search the car without it. Chambers presented no exigent circumstances to
justify dispensing with the warrant requirement once the occupants were ar-
rested and the car removed to the station house. Justice White apparently
recognized this and tried to interject exigencies by questioning whether the
police, under the Chambers facts, could properly have denied use of the vehi-
cle to anyone until they secured a search warrant.3 1 Aside from the fact that
in Chambers no request for the car had been made by anyone,232 permission
228. 39q U.S. 42 (1970).
229. Id. at 51-52.
230. Id. at 52.
231. Id.
232. But see Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971). In Coolidge, after the defend-
ant had been under investigation for murder for several weeks, he was arrested and his wife was
told that she would have to spend the night away from their home. The police refused her request
to use the family car. Pursuant to a search warrant the officers towed the car to the station house;
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to drive the car away probably would have been denied until the police fully
completed their search. The "true exigency" was eliminated when the Court
permitted the police to seize the moving vehicle and immobilize it at the police
station. Requiring the police to secure a warrant would have protected, fully
the occupants' privacy interest in the car's contents-the only privacy interest
now at stake. This approach confines the "vehicle exception" within its origi-
nal bounds by requiring separate justification for the subsequent search of the
vehicle. While the result in Carroll gave the police the choice between an
immediate search on the highway or what was a more burdensome and ad-
ministratively costly seizure, that option had already been exercised in Cham-
bers233 and clearly the warrantless search at the station house involved the
"greater" sacrifice of fourth amendment values.234 The short delay occa-
sioned in obtaining a warrant to search the car would not affect significantly
any necessary law enforcement procedure, but would have protected all pri-
vacy rights in the vehicle by requiring judicial determination of "probable
cause." This clearly is the balance struck in the fourth amendment that re-
quires strict adherence to the warrant requirement absent exigent
circumstances.
Establishment of the connecting link between the "automobile exception"
and the Katz "privacy doctrine" was sought in Cardwell v. Lews.23" In Card-
well, several months after a homicide, a warrant to arrest Lewis, a murder
suspect, was obtained by the police, who invited the suspect to come to the
police station house. He went, and after talking to the police was arrested.
Without seeking a warrant, the police towed his car from a public commercial
parking lot to the police impoundment lot. The next day an "examination"
was made of the tread of the right rear tire with tire tread casts made at the
murder scene. Also, paint samples were taken from Lewis' car to be matched
with those found on the fender of the victim's car.2
6
Cardwell's plurality opinion, by Justice Blackmun, was equivocal on the
issue of fourth amendment coverage, pointing to the fact that the "search-
examination" extended solely to the exterior of a car that had been parked in a
because the warrant was defective the government later attempted to introduce evidence obtained
from the search under the guise of the "automobile exception." The Court held that the evidence
was inadmissible and that the "automobile exception" was inapplicable as there were no exigen-
cies involved and the police had ample time in which to procure a valid search warrant. Id. at
462-64.
233. As one commentator has stated: "The result in Chambers is debatable because it reflects
a willingness to let the protection of substantial individual rights turn on the practical difficulties
of law enforcement." See Note, supra note 226, at 845. The Court has held that mere incon-
venience is an insufficient reason to dispense with the warrant requirement. Almeida-Sanchez v.
United States, 413 U.S. 266, 283 (1973).
234. 399 U.S. at 63 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). As Justice Harlan
said, "the lesser intrusion will almost always be the simple seizure of the car for the period-
perhaps a day-necessary to enable the officers to obtain a search warrant." Id. See United States
v. Van Leeuween, 397 U.S. 249 (1970) (the exigency which justified the seizure of a mailed pack-
age for 29 hours until a warrant was otained would not have supported the more intrusive war-
rantless search).
235. 417 U.S. 583 (1974).
236. Id. at 586-88.
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public lot. The Justice commented that since nothing from the interior of the
car was taken, whatever "search" had occurred was limited to the examination
of the exterior, and thus, he failed to see how this "exterior examination" in-
vaded any reasonable expectation of privacy which the fourth amendment was
designed to protect. 23 7 In any event, he declared, "[o]ne has a lesser expecta-
tion of privacy in a motor vehicle because its function is transportation and it
seldom serves as one's residence or as the repository of personal effects."
238
Although it is true that the Carroll opinion emphasized that for fourth
amendment purposes, there was a "necessary difference" between the search
of a stationary structure like a home and the search of a vehicle stopped on the
open road, since the vehicle, unlike the house, can be moved quickly out of the
jurisdiction prior to the procurement of a warrant, the Court clearly indicated
that the fourth amendment protections extend to automobiles.239 Rather, the
distinction rested on the mobility of the automobile, which may give rise to
"exigent circumstances," and not on some diminished expectation of privacy
in one's car, as such a diminished expectation has never, historically,24° been a
factor in the development of the "motor vehicle exception" doctrine.
The reasons cited by Justice Blackmun, in Cardwell, for the lesser expec-
tation of privacy in automobiles are not very convincing. He noted that a car
seldom serves "as the repository of personal effects," 24 1 yet the glove compart-
ments and trunks of many automobiles would belie this argument, since per-
sonal items frequently are kept there for reasons of privacy. Although a car
must travel public thoroughfares where its occupants and its contents are in
plain view, thus subjecting them to public scrutiny, drivers and passengers do
put their personal effects into those closed areas of a vehicle that are not open
to public inspection.
In South Dakota v. Oppenman,242 the Court, in searching for an addi-
tional rationale to support its theory of a diminished privacy right in
automobiles, declared that because a car is subject to various state regulations,
the owner has a lessened privacy expectation in the vehicle.243 But it is un-
clear how requiring annual inspection in public automotive centers or registra-
tion of a vehicle by mail or personal appearance at a motor vehicle department
237. Id. at 591. Justice Blackmun stated that the scraping of paint from the exterior of the car
was not the type of governmental action which triggers the traditional considerations regarding
the owner's right to privacy because such privacy historically existed only in reference to the
interior of the car. Id. at 591. But cf. Mascolo, The Role of Functional Observation in the Law of
Search and Seizure: A Study of Misconception, 71 Dick. L. Rev. 379, 415 (1967). ("The critical
defect in these cases denying to observations the status of search is their implicit insistence upon
divorcing the searcher from his mental processes.").
238. 417 U.S. at 590.
239. 267 U.S. at 153-56.
240. See generally Moylan, The Automobile Exception: What It Is and What It Is Not-A
Rationale in Search of a Clear Label, 27 Mercer L. Rev. 987 (1976); Comment, Warrantless
Searches and Seizures of Automobiles and the Supreme Court from Carroll to Cardwell: Incon-
sistently Through the Seamless Web, 53 N.C.L. Rev. 722 (1975).
241. 417 U.S. at 590.
242. 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
243. Id. at 368.
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diminishes one's privacy expectation regarding documents and personal be-
longings that thereafter may be locked in various compartments of the auto-
mobile, personal items that may touch upon the most intimate areas of an
individual's private affairs.244 For most Americans, common expectations
would appear to justify privacy in their automobiles, for "[u]sing the car as a
protected container, under lock and key, is general in American society.
'245
Justice Blackmun, in Cardwell, determined that even if a "search" had
occurred, the "examination-search" of the exterior of the car invaded no rea-
sonable privacy expectation, since it was exposed to public view.246 But the
police activity in Cardwell consisted not merely of viewing the exterior of the
vehicle, but of towing the car to the police station for a microscopic scrutiny of
paint scrapings taken from it, and an examination of the tire tread. Marshall v.
Barlow's, Inc. 247 and Lo-i Sales, Inc. v. New York248 have made clear that
although objects may be open to public scrutiny, they are not thereby made
fair game for unlimited governmental intrusion and the police have no greater
authority than that accorded any other member of the public to inspect
them.249 Furthermore, in Walter v. United States,250 in which misdelivered
obscene films mistakenly opened by a third party were turned over to F.B.I.
agents, the Court held that although the officers were in lawful possession of
the film and the descriptive labels on the canisters gave the agents probable
cause to believe that the films were obscene, this did not authorize their greater
intrusion of viewing the film (a separate search) without the benefit of a search
warrant.251 The Court viewed the third party private search in mistakenly
opening the boxes as frustrating the owner's expectation in part but not strip-
ping altogether the remaining privacy expectations in the contents of the film
vis-A-vis the government. Thus, the police still had to procure a warrant to
permit the greater intrusion of actually viewing the film. 252 Similarly, while
the car in Cardwell was involved in a serious crime, the police should have
been required to comply with the fourth amendment warrant mandate before
making their microscopic examination.
In Cardwell, regardless of whether the "examination" of the exterior of
the car is characterized as a search, clearly there was a seizure of the vehicle
without a warrant. However, applying the "automobile exception" as ex-
panded by Chambers, the Court concluded that Chambers supported either an
244. Justice Powell, in his concurring opinion in Opperman, stated that automobile searches
did not give the police the right to general searches, noting that in the course of the search, the
police may come across very personal and intimate objects. However, Justice Powell dismissed
this concern by stating that in the instant case there was no question of police overbreadth. 428
U.S. at 380 n.7 (Powell, J., concurring).
245. See Note, supra note 226, at 841.
246. Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. at 591.
247. 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
248. 442 U.S. 319 (1979).
249. See text accompanying notes 212-14 supra.
250. 447 U.S. 649 (1980).
251. Id. at 656.
252. Id. at 658-59.
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immediate search of the automobile in the parking lot or a seizure of the car
and a closer "examination" of it at the police station.253 The Cardwell Court
reasoned that Lewis, like Chambers, was alerted by his arrest to the possibility
of the police examining his car for incriminating evidence, thus creating the
exigent circumstances necessary to proceed to seize the vehicle without a war-
rant before his wife or family could remove or tamper with it.2 54 Rather than
relying on Chambers's broad reading, the Court should have followed its hold-
ing in Coolidge v. New Hampshire255 that requires the police to avail them-
selves of any ample opportunity they have to obtain a search warrant before
talking with a suspect.256 The Cardwell Court permitted the police to create
their own fictionalized exigencies by ignoring the fact that for several weeks
Cardwell was aware of the police suspicions and could have destroyed the
vehicle at any time during this period. Moreover, and most importantly, once
the car was in police custody and immobilized, there were no serious exigent
circumstances presented for not delaying the search while a warrant was
obtained.
The most disturbing feature of Cardwell, and from a fourth amendment
jurisprudential concept the most dangerous one, is Justice Blackmun's value
judgment that citizens have a diminished privacy expectation in vehicles. This
assumption has no persuasive rationale and has "crept into the law by im-
perceptible practice,' 25 7 providing the framework used for subsequent judicial
erosion of vehicle privacy. It is apparent that the Cardwell Court intended to
diminish the core privacy in motor vehicles but not to eliminate it alto-
gether.258 Since all privacy rights are not lost when an automobile is used, the
questions to be resolved are what privacy expectations do remain, and for
whom.
In United States v. Chadwick,259 the Government aligned itself with the
automobile exception and argued that luggage taken from an automobile had
the same potential mobility as the vehicle, so that a warrantless search based
upon probable cause was not unreasonable. In Chadwick, a 200-pound
double-locked footlocker containing marijuana was placed in the trunk of
Chadwick's car. Federal narcotics agents, acting upon probable cause,260 ar-
253. 417 U.S. at 593-94.
254. Id. at 594-95. Justice Stewart, in dissent, was unable to find the majority's mystical exi-
gencies. Since the automobile was effectively immobilized during the period of interrogation, the
ear that evidence might be destroyed was hardly an exigency, particularly when no such fear had
prompted a seizure during all the preceding months while Lewis, though under investigation, had
been in full control of the car. Id. at 598-99 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
255. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
256. Id. at 460-61.
257. Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1030, 1067 (1765) (reference to searching for stolen
goods in a house).
258. 417 U.S. at 589-91.
259. 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
260. Probable cause was established by the fact that the railroad officials in San Diego were
alerted to the possibility of a drug smuggling operation when they observed talcum powder leak-
ing from an unusually heavy footlocker. Also, one of the persons carrying the locker matched a
profile of drug carriers. The railroad officials notified local federal officials, who in turn contacted
the Boston officials. The locker was identified in a prior description given to Boston and so was
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rested three persons who were connected with moving the trunk from the Bos-
ton railway station to the car. The arrest took place while the trunk of the car
was still open and before the engine had been started. The defendants, the
car, and the footlocker were taken to the Federal Building in Boston where, an
hour and a half after the arrest, the agents, with neither a search warrant nor
the defendants' consent, opened the footlocker and discovered large amounts
of marijuana.
The Government's argument applying the automobile analogy was clear:
the mobility of the footlocker is analogous to that of motor vehicles for fourth
amendment purposes and therefore it should be subject to search without a
warrant upon a showing of probable cause.261 Chief Justice Burger, for the
majority, refused to accept this analogy, stressing that "a person's expectations
of privacy in personal luggage are substantially greater than in an automo-
bile."'262 For the Chief Justice, the government's comparison failed in that the
factors which diminish the privacy aspects of an automobile simply do not
apply to the contents of a double-locked footlocker that is not open to continu-
ous public view nor subjected to regular inspections. Furthermore, the foot-
locker's mobility did not justify dispensing with a warrant, for, as the Court
observed, once the footlocker was seized and safely transferred to the Federal
Building, it was under the agents' exclusive control, and therefore, there was
not the slightest danger that its contents would be removed before a valid
search warrant could be obtained.
263
The majority decision prompted Justice Blackmun in dissent to comment
that: "[I]f the agents had postponed the arrest just a few minutes longer until
the respondents started to drive away, then the car could have been seized,
taken to the agent's office, and all its contents-including the footlocker-
searched without a warrant." 264 Justice Brennan, aligning himself with the
majority, took the opportunity in his concurring opinion to comment that it
was not at all obvious that the agents could have proceeded as Justice Black-
mun had suggested. 265 The issue was thus presented: Assuming that a war-
rantless search of an automobile is constitutionally permissible under the
automobile exception, does the intrusion necessarily permit the search of
closed containers found in the vehicle?
Almost this precise question was presented to the Court in Arkansas v.
Sanders,266 in which the police, having probable cause to believe that a taxi
was carrying a suitcase containing contraband, stopped the vehicle and had
the taxi driver open the trunk. Without seeking the owner's permission, the
police opened the unlocked suitcase and discovered the contraband. The
one of the men carrying ,it. Also, a police dog signaled that the locker contained a controlled
substance. Id. at 3-4.
261. Id. at 11-12.
262. Id. at 13.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 22-23 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
265. Id. at 16-17 (Brennan, J., concurring).
266. 442 U.S. 753 (1979).
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Sanders majority, in holding that the search was unconstitutional, laid the
basis for broad privacy protections of closed containers found within vehicles.
The Court admitted that luggage may be as mobile as the vehicle in which it is
carried, but "the exigency of mobility must be assessed at the point immedi-
ately before the search. '2 67 Once the police have seized the suitcase and have
it within their control, the special mobility exigency is no longer applicable,
and accordingly there is generally "no greater need for warrantless searches of
luggage taken from automobiles than of luggage taken from other places.
'268
As in Chadwick, the Sanders majority commented on the significant dis-
tinction between automobiles and other private property, noting that "the con-
figuration, use, and regulation of automobiles often may dilute the reasonable
expectation of privacy that exists with respect to differently situated prop-
erty."269 The Court. again noted that the very purpose of a suitcase is to serve
as a repository for personal items that people wish to transport, thereby requir-
ing greater privacy protections than that accorded to the vehicle within which
the items are transported.270
The Chief Justice concurred with the Sanders majority but forcefully ar-
gued that these facts simply did not present the precise issue whether it is
permissible to intrude into a closed container found in a vehicle when there is
probable cause to believe that contraband is located somewhere within the
vehicle but its exact location is unknown by the officer. The Chief Justice
pointed out that in Sanders the suspected locus of the contraband was in the
luggage, and the fact that the suitcase was resting in the trunk of the automo-
bile at the time of the seizure and search did not bring it within the "automo-
bile exception."27'
The Chief Justice's continued uncertainty, whether the "automobile ex-
ception" justifies the warrantless search of a closed container found during the
search of an automobile, was finally ended when Justice Stewart, in Robbins v.
Calfornia,2 72 determined for the plurality Court that a closed container found
in the luggage compartment of a station wagon is protected to the same extent
as if it were found anywhere else. Relying on Chadwick and Sanders, Justice
Stewart determined that a warrantless search of two green, opaque plastic
packages (which turned out to contain bricks of marijuana), found during an
otherwise lawful, warrantless search of an automobile violated the fourth
amendment since the closed containers manifested Robbins' reasonable expec-
tation of privacy with respect to their contents. Justice Stewart dismissed as
inappropriate the government's contention that the nature of a container may
267. Id. at 763.
268. Id. at 764. The Court noted, however, that there may be some special circumstances in
which it would be appropriate for the police to search luggage without a warrant. However, this
would be justified by the probable cause and exigencies of the situation and not as a result of the
suitcase having been found inside an automobile. Id. at 763 n.ll.
269. Id. at 761.
270. Id. at 764-65.
271. Id. at 767 (Burger, CJ., concurring).
272. 101 S. Ct. 2841 (1981).
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diminish its protection-"that the Fourth Amendment protects only contain-
ers commonly used to transport 'personal effects.' ",273 Appropriately the Jus-
tice observed that the fourth amendment protects people and their effects; "it
protects those effects whether they are 'personal' or 'impersonal,' ,,274 and
when they are placed within a container, it reflects a desire to keep their con-
tents free from public examination.
The Chadwick-Sanders-Robbins cases have reflected the Court's strong
preference for a warrant requirement. The Sanders Court especially pro-
claimed this pro-warrant position, noting that the mere reasonableness of a
search is not a substitute for the judicial warrant protection. Stressing again
the prominent place the warrant requirement plays in safeguarding fourth
amendment protections, the Court once more repeated its oft-quoted admoni-
tion that the exceptions to the warrant command should be few, "jealously and
carefully drawn, ' 275 and limited to the necessity to accommodate a specific
need.
276
It is therefore very surprising that Justice Stewart, the author of Robbins,
felt compelled to draw a "bright line" in New York v. Belton277 by deciding
that when a policeman has made a "lawful custodial arrest" of the occupant of
an automobile, he may, in accordance with Chimel v. California,278 search the
entire passenger compartment of the automobile as a search incident to that
arrest. In deciding that the search of the interior of the passenger compartment
would justify the search of the arrested person's jacket located therein, Justice
Stewart, for the plurality, determined that the jacket (like any other container)
may be lawfully searched without a warrant since the "lawful custodialarrest"
justifies the infringement of whatever privacy interests the arrested person may
have in it.
279
Justice Brennan, in dissent, observed that Chimel, in governing the per-
missible scope of warrantless searches incident to a custodial arrest, was
strictly tied to two principal concerns: "the safety of the arresting officer and
the preservation of easily concealed or destructible evidence. '28 0 ChiMel,
therefore, permitted officers who have effected a custodial arrest to conduct a
warrantless search "'of the arrestee's person and the area "within his immedi-
273. Id. at 2845.
274. Id. at 2846.
275. Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 759 (1979) (quoting Jones v. United States, 357 U.S.
493, 499 (1958)).
276. Id. at 760.
277. 101 S. Ct. 2860 (1981).
278. 395 U.S. 752 (1969). In Chimel, after the police had lawfully arrested the defendant for
burglary, they made an extensive search of his home without obtaining a search warrant. The
Court recognized that police face the serious danger of a suspect carrying a concealed weapon or
surreptitiously destroying evidence. Therefore, the Court held that at the time of the arrest, the
police had the right to search the suspect's person and areas within his "immediate control," con-
struing that phrase to mean places where the defendant "might reach in order to grab a weapon or
evidentiary items." Id. at 763. However, the Court refused to permit the search of the home,
stating that the exigencies of the situation did not justify the broad exception from the fourth
amendment's warrant requirement Id.
279. 101 S. Ct. at 2864.
280. Id. at 2866 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Vol. 60
91]PRVACY AND STANDING
ate control"-construing that phrase to mean the area from within which he
might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.' "281 Since Belton
and his companions were removed from the car and then placed under custo-
dial arrest, permitting the officer then to go back and search the interior of the
car, including areas and containers inaccessible to the arrested persons, the
decision is both "analytically unsound" and inconsistent with the justification
supporting the Chimel "search incident to lawful arrest" exception to the war-
rant requirement.
The Chadwick-Sanders-Robbins decisions have shown that the protected
privacy interest in the contents of the article seized is the critical factor to be
considered in evaluating a warrantless fourth amendment intrusion. The
seizure of closed containers during an automobile stop and search does not
diminish the privacy expectations in their contents. With the containers firmly
secure in the government's possession, it is unreasonable for the Court to per-
mit the additional and greater intrusion of a search without a warrant.
282
In struggling to maintain a reasonable position to support the conclusion
that a "lesser intrusion" concept does not apply to the entire automobile once
the vehicle has been successfully immobilized, the Chadwick Court, in a foot-
note, suggests that absolutely secure facilities may not be available to store the
vehicle and that the size and inherent mobility of a vehicle make it susceptible
to theft or intrusion by vandals.283 But this argument has no support, since the
economic cost of providing secure storage facilities was not the basis for the
early development of the automobile exception. Rather, it was the impracti-
cality of immobilizing the car "on the highway" for the time required to obtain
a warrant. Even if secure. facilities are truly unavailable, the Court's strong
commitment to a warrant requirement is such that it is not unduly burden-
some to require a police officer to remain with the vehicle while another mem-
ber of the force obtains a warrant for its search.284 The Chadwick-Sanders-
Robbins decisions reaffirm that warrants for a search must be obtained when-
ever practical, even if the initial seizure is valid. These decisions require the
police to pursue the course of behavior which intrudes least on an individual's
privacy.
In Chambers285 the police seized the car and drove it to the station house
where they conducted a probable cause search without a warrant. There
clearly were no exigent circumstances which justified dispensing with the war-
rant requirement. The inherent mobility of a vehicle, as pointed out in Coo-
lidge v. New Hampshire,286 does not in itself justify a warrantless search. A
281. Id. (quoting Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. at 763).
282. Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 13. But see Belton, 101 S. Ct. at 2865 n.5.
283. 433 U.S. at 13 n.7. See also Sanders, 442 U.S. at 765 n.14.
284. See State v. Miles, 97 Idaho 396, 545 P.2d 484 (1976); State v. Navarro, 312 So. 2d 848
(La. 1975). Additionally, the burden on a federal agent in obtaining a warrant is minimal since
Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(C)(2)(A) provides that "a Federal magistrate may issue a warrant based upon
sworn oral testimony communicated by telephone or other appropriate means" where the circum-
stances support dispensing with the requirement of a written affidavit.
285. 399 U.S. 42 (1970). See text accompanying notes 228-34 supra.
286. 403 U.S. 443, 462 (1971). See note 232 supra.
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real possibility of the vehicle being moved without police authorization must
be shown before the Carroll "exigency" doctrine should apply. And, as noted
in Chadwick and Sanders, the "exigency" must be assessed immediately
before the search-at the point when the police have seized the object to be
searched and have it securely within their control. Although Justice White, in
Chambers, claimed that it was questionable whether the greater intrusion is
the immediate search or the indefinite seizure of an automobile until a warrant
is obtained,287 it is clear that as far as objects other than vehicles are con-
cerned, the Court, in Robbins, has determined that the seizure and immobili-
zation of the container until a warrant is obtained for its search is the lesser
privacy intrusion.
The Chadwick-Sanders-Robbins opinions reaffirm the Katz pronounce-
ment that the privacy interest in the contents of the article is the most critical
factor at stake in evaluating a warrantless search. The Chadwick Court
stressed that the footlocker had been double-locked, manifesting an expecta-
tion that its contents would remain closed to public inspection.288 In Sanders,
the Court again noted that luggage is a common repository for one's personal
effects and, therefore, it is inevitably associated with an expectation of pri-
vacy.2 89 Justice Blackmun declared in Cardwell that there is a lesser expecta-
tion of privacy in a vehicle because its main function is transportation and it
rarely serves as a repository of personal effects. 290 But it is readily apparent,
both by the judiciary's continued preoccupation with the repeated challenges
to police searches of vehicles and by the need for a majority of the Court in
Belton to draw a "bright line" to guide police in searches of the interior of
automobiles incident to a lawful arrest, that citizens do keep personal effects in
their cars. Furthermore there is no logical equation between the degrees of
expectation of privacy in vehicles on the one hand and the transportation fea-
ture of a vehicle on the other. In fact, today many motor vehicles, such as
recreational vans and mobile homes, have characteristics very similar to pri-
vate homes. America's love affair with the automobile certainly began be-
cause of the mobility it provided, but it is also evident that the automobile has
become an extension of its owner's personality. Cars are often used for private
activity and owners often do put personal items in closed compartments of the
vehicle to keep them secret.2 91 Interestingly, in Delaware v. Prouse,292 Justice
White observed that "[a]utomobile travel is a basic, pervasive, and often nec-
essary mode of transportation to and from one's home, workplace, and leisure
activities .... Undoubtedly, many find a greater sense of security and pri-
vacy in traveling in an automobile than they do in exposing themselves by
pedestrian or other modes of travel. '293 This heightened recognition of an
287. 399 U.S. at 51-52.
288. 433 U.S. at 11.
289. 442 U.S. at 764.
290. 417 U.S. at 590.
291. See Note, supra note 226, at 841.
292. 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
293. Id. at 662.
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automobile occupant's expectation of privacy marks a shift from the Court's
previous restrictive position regarding automobile privacy expectations.
The necessity that may justify the immediate seizure of a moving vehicle
without a warrant does not support the more intrusive warrantless searches
into the closed compartments of the vehicle. The Carroll automobile excep-
tion hinged on giving the police the choice between an immediate search of a
moving vehicle or the more burdensome and costly administrative seizure,294
with the former being the more frequently exercised option. The desirability
of this result, permitting privacy expectations to be diminished by an adminis-
trative cost factor, is itself debatable. Perhaps this option is a realistic alterna-
tive, but if the Court places a very high value on the warrant safeguard, it
should, even under the Carroll theory, compel the police to pursue that course
of behavior which best protects privacy rights. The "automobile exception"
would thereby be narrowed to validate only the initial seizure of the vehicle
under truly "exigent circumstances" rather than permit the greater privacy in-
trusion of a search without obtaining prior judicial approval. 295 Certainly
there is no justification for adhering to Chambers once the vehicle has been
immobilized and the threat of loss or disappearance has been negated.
2 96
STANDING: PRE-A.!4s-THE JONES CONCEPT
The fourth amendment standing concept, for the most part, has been an
attempt to ameliorate the social cost inherent in the application of the exclu-
sionary rule. Essentially, standing to raise an objection to a search and seizure
concerns the question whether the party is entitled to have his claim to a
fourth amendment protected right determined by the court. Prior to Jones v.
United States,297 fourth amendment standing was controlled by perplexing
common law property concepts. The traditional viewpoint permitted standing
if the party established either a possessory or proprietary interest in the object
seized or the premises searched. Many of the subtle common law propety
distinctions produced a multitude of confused lower court opinions as to ex-
actly what interests in the premises searched or property seized would be suffi-
cient to confer standing.
2 98
The Supreme Court, in Jones, interpreted rule 41(e) of the Federal Rules
294. See Note, supra note 226, at 845.
295. See Rosenberg, United States v. Chadwick and the Lesser Intrusion Concept: The Unrea-
sonableness of Being Reasonable, 58 B.U.L. Rev. 436, 467 (1978).
296. Justice Harlan clearly expressed in Chambers his preference for the "lesser intrusion."
[Tihe occupants of the car have an interest in privacy that is protected by the Fourth
Amendment even where the circumstances justify a temporary seizure... .The Court's
endorsement of a warrantless invasion of that privacy where another course would suf-
fice is simply inconsistent with our repeated stress on the Fourth Amendment's mandate
of "adherence to judicial processes."
399 U.S. 42, 64 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
297. 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
298. See generally Edwards, Standing to Suppress Unreasonably Seized Evidence, 47 Nw.
U.L. Rev. 471 (1952); Gutterman, supra note 19; Trager & Lobenfeld, The Law of Standing
Under the Fourth Amendment, 41 Brooklyn L. Rev. 421 (1975); White & Greenspan, Standing to
Object to Search and Seizure, 118 U. Pa. L. Rev. 333 (1970).
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of Criminal Procedure, the provision that enforces the federal exclusionary
rule. Justice Frankfurter, writing for a unanimous court, held that to qualify
as a "person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure" under the rule,
"one must have been a victim of a search or seizure, one against whom the
search was directed, as distinguished from one who claims prejudice only
through the use of evidence gathered as a consequence of a search or seizure
directed at someone else." 299 This recognition of a personal privacy invasion,
although not deviating from prior rulings, was used in Jones to extend the
ambit of fourth amendment protections to persons not previously covered.
Jones was a guest in an apartment that had been leased by a friend who
was away for several days. Jones kept some clothing in the apartment, had
been given a key to it, and had spent perhaps one night there. Federal narcot-
ics officers, in searching the apartment pursuant to a warrant, found narcotics
hidden in a bird's nest in a window awning. Jones was convicted of violating
several federal narcotics laws. The Government had contended that he lacked
standing to challenge the search and seizure because he had not claimed the
requisite interest in either the narcotics seized or the apartment searched.
Justice Frankfurter recognized the fallibility of a standing concept based
solely on property interests and began to shift the fourth amendment standing
perspective away from the control of historical property law principles. After
noting that property distinctions ought not to be determinative in fashioning
procedures ultimately referable to constitutional safeguards, 3°° he expanded
the concept of "privacy interests" in the premises to permit standing for "any-
one legitimately on [theJpremises where a search occurs. '30 1 Jones, present in
the apartment with consent of the lessee at the time of the search, was held to
have standing. The Jones decision did not discard the historical property in-
terests that had in the past determined standing;302 rather, the Court added an
additional category conferring standing, that of a privacy interest established
by being "legitimately on the premises at the time of the search." The Court
also removed the dilemma that faced a defendant who, charged with a crime
involving possession and desirous of vindicating his fourth amendment rights
was "forced to allege facts [at the preliminary motion] the proof of which
would tend, if indeed not be sufficient, to convict him. '30 3 The Court deter-
mined that the standing requirement could not be employed to place a defend-
ant in such a dilemma and fashioned an automatic standing rule in crimes
where possession of tangible property is an essential element of the offense
charged. The Court thereby eliminated any necessity for a preliminary show-
ing of an interest in the property seized which ordinarily would be required
299. 362 U.S. at 261. Although based upon an interpretation of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, Jones was generally viewed as establishing a minimum constitutional guideline appli-
cable to the states. See Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969).
300. 362 U.S. at 266. Justice Frankfurter said that "[d]istinctions such as those between
'lessee,' 'licensee,' 'invitee' and'gut,' ojen-only of gossamer strength, ought not to be determina-
tive in fashioning procedures ultaey referable to constitutional safeguards." Id.
301. Id. at 267 (emphasis added).
302. See Gutterman, supra note 19, at 115.
303. 362 U.S. at 262.
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when standing was based upon this premise.3°4 Of course, in situations where
the automatic standing rule was inapplicable, where conviction did not flow
from the defendant's possession of the evidence at the time of the search, the
defendant was still required to establish his privacy interest in the property
seized or premises searched in order to gain standing.
In Jones, Justice Frankfurter observed that the exclusionary rule is "a
means for making effective the protection of privacy" benefiting those search
victims whose privacy has been invaded.30 5 Jones began the movement of
fourth amendment standing away from strict property concepts. In Warden v.
Hayden,30 6 the Court abandoned the "mere evidence" rule, which had limited
the items subject to seizure to instrumentalities, fruits of the crime, or contra-
band,307 holding that in testing the scope of fourth amendment protections,
property interests do not control the government's right to search and seize
evidence. 308 Just several months after Hayden, the Supreme Court decided
Katz, and without inquiring into the issue of the defendant's standing, refused
to admit into evidence a recorded conversation obtained through an electronic
eavesdropping device, attached by federal agents without a warrant to the ex-
terior of a telephone booth.309 The Court declared that the fourth amendment
"protects people, not places." 310 Katz, having paid his toll and shut the door,
had a degree of privacy upon which he could justifiably rely while using the
telephone booth.
311
The movement towards a personal privacy rather than a property related
approach to fourth amendment protections logically compelled a concomitant
shift in standing from its traditional property related analysis to one reflective
of Katz's changing parameters of the amendment's protective shield.312 This
closer accommodation between the policies underlying fourth amendment pri-
vacy protection and the law of standing was broadly hinted at in Mancusi v.
Deforte.3 13 Deforte was a union official who shared a large office with several
other union officials. Despite his protests, state officials conducted a warrant-
304. Id. at 263-65. The "automatic standing rule" announced in Jones was overruled by the
Court in United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980). The Salvucci Court stated that since Sim-
mons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968) held that the defendant's testimony at his suppression
hearing could not be used as substantive evidence at his subsequent trial, the reasons supporting
the creation of the automatic standing rule no longer had merit. For an analysis of the circum-
stances supporting the Court's development of the rule see Gutterman, supra note 19, at 120-123.
305. 362 U.S. at 261.
306. 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
307. The Court formulated the "mere evidence rule" based on property interests and rights in
Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921).
308. 387 U.S. at 304.
309. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352-53 (1967). See text accompanying notes 23-35
supra.
310. 389 U.S. at 351.
311. Id. at 352. But see Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (A pen register installed on a
private telephone did not constitute a search since the defendant assumed the risk that the tele-
phone company would inform the police of the numbers he dialed.). See text accompanying notes
205-11 supra.
312. See Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223 (1973); Combs v. United States, 408 U.S. 224
(1972); Gutterman, supra note 19.
313. 392 U.S. 364 (1968).
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less search of the office and seized certain union records which were in his
custody; the records subsequently being admitted at his conspiracy and extor-
tion trial. In approaching the standing issue, the Court, while clearly recogniz-
ing that Deforte had standing under Jones's "legitimately on [the] premises"
test,314 preferred to base its holding not on that rationale but rather on the
newly formulated Katz privacy concept. In applying the privacy concept, the
Deforte Court concluded that Katz "makes it clear that capacity to claim the
protection of the Amendment depends not upon a property right in the in-
vaded place but upon whether the area was one in which there was a reason-
able expectation of freedom from governmental intrusion. 315 Deforte
provided the clear signal that the Court was prepared to shift its standing anal-
ysis away from the traditional property related rule to a Katz privacy
approach.316
RAKAS AND ITS PROGENY: PRIVACY AND STANDING-
THE INTERTWINED ANALYSIS
Although automobile travel has become a crucial and integral part of our
daily life, the Court has vacillated in defining the privacy rights and the pri-
vacy expectations of the persons operating or riding within them. In Chambers
v. Maroney,317 the Court eliminated "exigencies" from the "vehicle excep-
tion," and declared that "for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment there is a
constitutional difference between houses and cars."318 The very next term, in
Coolidge v. New Hampshire,319 the Court viewed the warrantless search of a
vehicle as unreasonable because of the lack of "exigent circumstances," and
proclaimed that "[t]he word 'automobile' is not a talisman in whose presence
the Fourth Amendment fades away and disappears. z320 In Delaware v.
Prouse,321 the Court stated that "[ain individual operating or traveling in an
automobile does not lose all reasonable expectation of privacy simply because
the automobile and its use are subject to government regulation."3 22 In the
same term the Court decided Prouse, however, Justice Rehnquist, writing for
the majority in Rakas v. Illinois,323 narrowed the group of persons whose pri-
vacy interest may be implicated by a vehicle search. The Court in Rakas held
that the Jones standard for determining fourth amendment standing, if ap-
plied literally to passengers legitimately present in the vehicle, was "too broad
a gauge for measurement of Foufth Amendment rights," and would not be
used to determine a passenger's legitimate expectation of privacy in the
314. Id. at 370.
315. Id. at 368.
316. Gutterman, supra note 19, at 117.
317. 399 U.S. 42 (1970). See text accompanying notes 228-34 supra.
318. 399 U.S. at 52.
319. 403 U.S. 443 (1971). See note 232 supra.
320. 403 U.S. at 461-62.
321. 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
322. Id. at 662.




The Rakas decision does, however, provide the link intertwining the Katz
privacy expectation concept with the traditional standing requirement. The
events in Rakas began with the robbery of a clothing store. A short time after
the holdup a police officer, notified of the robbery, spotted an automobile
matching the description of the robbery getaway car occupied by two men and
two women. The occupants were ordered out of the car and in a search of the
vehicle a box of rifle shells in the locked glove compartment and a sawed-off
rifle under the front passenger seat were discovered. The defendants, passen-
gers in the car, were arrested and tried for armed robbery. Before trial they
moved to suppress the rifle and shells seized from the car but the trial judge
denied the motion, ruling that the defendants had no property interest in the
car nor in the objects seized and, therefore, they had no standing to challenge
the validity of the search.
32
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, agreed that the defendants lack-
ed standing and in so holding reevaluated traditional doctrines of fourth
amendment standing and substantive fourth amendment protections. The
Court began its analysis by eliminating the traditional standing inquiry, inte-
grating it into the issue of substantive fourth amendment protections. Decid-
ing that it served no useful analytical purpose to consider standing distinct
from the merits of the fourth amendment challenge, the Court declared that
"the better analysis forthrightly focuses on the extent of a particular defend-
ant's rights under the Fourth Amendment, rather than on any theoretically
separate, but invariably intertwined concept of standing."326 The Court then
shifted its inquiry to a substantive fourth amendment determination rather
than a separate methodical application of standing rules.
In applying its new analysis the Court announced that Jones merely
stands for the "unremarkable" proposition that an individual can have a suffi-
cient fourth amendment privacy interest in a place other than his own
home,327 and concluded that "legitimate presence" is not the sole test of this
privacy interest.328 The Court resolved that Katz provides the guidepost in
determining the appropriate measure of fourth amendment substantive protec-
tions, and that under Katz the capacity to claim coverage depends upon
whether the individual has a "legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded
place."'329 Although conceding that it was under no illusion that this test
would make the cases any less difficult, the Court determined that decisions
under the new approach would "rest on sounder logical footing."
330
In focusing on the privacy expectations that "mere, passengers have in
324. Id. at 142-43.
325. The Appellate Court of Illinois affirmed in People v. Rakas, 46 IL App. 3d 569, 360
N.E.2d 1252 (1977).
326. 439 U.S. at 139.
327. Id. at 142.
328. Id. at 148.
329. Id. at 143.
330. Id. at 140.
1981]
NORTH C4ROLINA LAW REVIEWV
the automobile in which they are riding, Justice Rehnquist reasoned that their
legitimate privacy expectations "must have a source outside of the Fourth
Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real or personal property or to
understandings that are recognized and permitted by society." 331 The Court
decided that under this formulation the Rakas defendants lacked standing
since they "asserted neither a property nor a possessory interest in the automo-
bile, nor an interest in the property seized. ' 332 In comparing the privacy inter-
ests of Jones and Katz to Rakas, Justice Relmquist maintained that Jones had
asserted complete dominion and control over the apartment and could exclude
others; likewise Katz, having paid his "toll" and closed the door, was in a
similar position to control the areas searched. Rakas, in contrast, as a "mere"
passenger had no such control over the automobile and, therefore, no privacy
rights in it.
333
The Rakas majority can be criticized for failing to delineate those factors
outside of property concepts that may give a passenger a sufficient privacy
interest in the vehicle to contest the government's intrusion. Although the ma-
jority reiterated that property law concepts are not controlling, the only inter-
ests given specific approval are those based on property concepts of ownership,
possession, and control.334 While property concepts may affirmatively estab-
lish the passenger's privacy expectations, society should recognize and respect
a privacy interest based upon a "special relationship" of the passenger with the
vehicle. Certainly the driver-owner of a car, by expressly sharing dominion
and control over specific areas of the vehicle (e.g., the trunk or glove compart-
ment) with his rider, can confer upon his companions a recognizable privacy
interest in these areas. And even without this express authority, the relation-
ship of the passenger to the vehicle (e.g., spouse or child to owner) should
create legitimate privacy expectations in the car.335 In fact, contrary to the
Court's understanding, the public view is probably that a passenger in a car
with the owner's consent expects and should be accorded privacy in the
vehicle. 3
36
The majority's unsatisfactory resolution was caused by its unwillingness
to develop a consistent doctrinal approach for determining what interests in
the vehicle warrant judicial protection. Justice Powell, concurring in Rakas,
was willing to make the express determination that in fourth amendment juris-
prudence there is a lesser expectation of privacy in an automobile than in
other locations. His "sound reasons" for this distinction are the "public" na-
ture of the automobile and the fact that it is subject to extensive regulation and
331. Id. at 143 n.12.
332. Id. at 148.
333. Id. at 148-49.
334. Id. at 143 n.12.
335. See 439 U.S. at 163-64 (White, J., dissenting). See also Pollard v. State, 388 N.E.2d 496,
502 (Ind. 1979), in which the court held that a husband had a legitimate expectation of privacy in
his wife's car.
336. See 439 U.S. at 164 n.14 (White, J., dissenting).
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inspection.337 Despite this value judgment, his concurrence does suggest sev-
eral considerations, in addition to property interests, which have been recog-
nized as relevant in prior Court decisions: whether the person took normal
precautions to maintain his privacy, the way the person used the location, and
the historical basis for the fourth amendment intrusion.338 In rejecting the
defendant's privacy interest claim, however, Justice Powell failed to delineate
what factors under his criteria Rakas lacked, relying instead upon traditional
property concepts and his personal value judgment that privacy expectations
are lessened in vehicles.
By unduly emphasizing factors of a personal nature that have in the past
determined standing, the Rakas Court gave inappropriate weight to tradi-
tional property concepts in applying its Katz substantive based "privacy con-
cept." This is not too surprising since orthodox standing decisions have
concluded that deterrence is amply served by preventing incrimination of
those whose rights the police have violated and these rights historically have
been determined by reference to property concepts. But, had the Court started
its analysis in recognition of the shared collective desire to maintain "security
and privacy in traveling in an automobile," 339 the Court may have proceeded
by an alternate route to a different conclusion. It would have been reasonable
and consistent with society's shared understanding for the Rakas Court to
have concluded that the citizen's expectation is that presence in an automobile
with the owner's permission constitutes a sufficient privacy interest in the vehi-
cle to justify freedom from any unreasonable governmental intrusion.34° By
refusing to recognize this shared expectation Rakcas granted law enforcement
the prerogative to act outside the fourth amendment, thereby severely under-
mining the privacy values Katz sought to protect.
Having favored "property rights" in Rakas, it is surprising that Justice
Rehnquist, in Rawlings v. Kentucky,341 again writing for the Court, rejected all
"arcane" concepts of property law and concluded that ownership of drugs is
but one factor to be considered in determining a defendant's ability to claim
fourth amendment protection.342 Although the Court recognized that histori-
cally Rawlings may have been given standing to challenge the search in a
bailment situation, when he "dumped" his drugs into his companion's purse
just prior to a police raid, the majority opinion concluded that "the precipitous
nature of the transaction hardly supports a reasonable inference that [Rawl-
ings] took normal precautions to protect his privacy." 343 According to the
Court, Rawlings' "frank admission" that he had no subjective expectations
337. 439 U.S. at 153-54 & n.2 (Powell, J., concurring). See also United States v. Chadwick,
433 U.S. 1, 7-9 (1977); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974). For criticism of this perspective see
text accompanying notes 241-45 supra.
338. 439 U.S. at 151-55 (Powell, J., concurring).
339. Delaware v. Prouse, 400 U.S. 648, 662 (1979). See generally Amsterdam, supra note 7.
340. See 439 U.S. at 162, 167 (White, J., dissenting).
341. 448 U.S. 98 (1980).
342. Id. at 105.
343. Id.
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that his companion's "purse would remain free from government intrusion,"
when added to the fact that he had no right to exclude others from her purse,
permitted the finding that under the "totality of the circumstances" Rawlings
had failed in his burden of proving he had a legitimate expectation of privacy
in the purse.
3 "
The Rawlings Court's narrow interpretation appears contrary to the
fourth amendment's guarantee of privacy in personal effects. Certainly a citi-
zen's right of privacy from government intrusion into his personal effects does
not require that he have physical control of the property. He can reasonably
expect that his lawfully possessed effects will remain undisturbed upon prem-
ises where they have been placed lawfully or in the custody of a third party to
whom they have lawfully been entrusted even if he does not have the exclusive
right or ability to exclude others.345 For example, the Court, in Mancusi v.
DeForte,346 affirmatively counseled that although an office may be shared by
several persons, this fact does not indicate that any of the persons sharing the
office has relinquished his privacy expectation in it from governmental intru-
sion.347 Although Rawlings may not have "shared" exclusively his compan-
ion's purse, the issue of her consent to place his drugs in the pocketbook is an
important one in the determination of his privacy expectations. But the Court
summarily dismissed this issue by stating that even if Rawlings had her con-
sent, the precipitous nature of the transaction hardly supported a reasonable
inference that Rawlings took "normal precautions" to-maintain his privacy.348
It is difficult to determine whether the Court has decided that the quick-
ness of Rawlings' action showed his lack of a privacy expectation or whether
his precipitous action was a "waiver" or "abandonment" of his privacy rights.
Furthermore, the Court, in declaring that Rawlings did not take "normal pre-
cautions" to maintain privacy, failed to evaluate the reasonableness of alterna-
tive precautions Rawlings could have taken to preserve his privacy from the
certainty that the police were going to search him. Certainly the proximity of
his companion's consent to the government's activities had no place in a deter-
mination of Rawlings' desire to maintain his privacy or in judging the legiti-
macy of his fourth amendment claim. And clearly, when his property was
seized from his companion's purse, a place where he had permission to put it,
his personal privacy interest had been intruded upon. Traditional standing
concepts unquestionably support the view that a property interest in the item
seized from the custody of one to whom it has lawfully been entrusted is suffi-
cient to establish the owner as a victim of a privacy invasion, thereby requiring
the Court to determine the reasonableness of the police action.349
344. Id. at 105, 110.
345. See Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 389-90 (1968); United States v. Jeffers, 342
U.S. 48, 54 (1951); Gutterman, supra note 19.
346. 392 U.S. 364 (1968).
347. Id. at 369.
348. 448 U.S. at 105.
349. See Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257,261 (1960); United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48,
54 (1951). Although recognizing that under traditional rules Rawlings may have been piven
standing, Justice Rehnquist stated that he would have lost his claim on the merits. This position is
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The most disturbing aspect of the majority opinion is the Court's reliance
on Rawlings' "frank admissions" that he had no "subjective expectation" that
his companion's purse would remain free from government inspection.350 By
crediting this admission, the Court approved the position that a "subjective
belief' that the police will inevitably perform the search is a determining fac-
tor in considering the fourth amendment's privacy protections. In defining the
amendment's coverage according to the perception of those individuals whose
dealings with the government lead them to expect little in privacy protections
from the police, the Court has "belittled" the meaning of Katz. By injecting a
subjective, self-determining principle into fourth amendment protections, the
Court permits the government by repeated privacy invasion to accustom the
citizenry to adjust their expectations to the most minimal level of privacy re-
quired in a free society.
351
Katz did not purport to restrict the interests protected by the fourth
amendment and clearly the rationale of the pre-Katz standing cases supports
privacy in this bailment relationship. In the Rawlings dissent, Justice Marshall
firmly declared that a property interest in the item seized is enough to establish
that the defendant's personal fourth amendment rights are involved, thereby
construing the protective function of the fourth amendment in a much broader
fashion.352 And, as Justice Marshall further recognized, "[a] slow and steady
erosion of the ability of victims of unconstitutional searches and seizures to
obtain a remedy for the invasion of their rights saps the constitutional guaran-
tee of its life just as surely as would a substantive limitation.
353
The Court has, in the past, attempted to balance the competing purposes
of the fourth amendment's privacy protections against the deterrent aspects
incorporated in the exclusionary rule.354 In seeking a proper formula, one
approach that has been suggested is that "standing" need not turn exclusively
upon the extent to which the complaining party's privacy is invaded, but as
Justice Fortas urged in Alderman v. United States,355 should also focus on the
extent to which the officer intended at the time of the search to find evidence
premised on his hypothetical that "[hiad petitioner placed his drugs in plain view, he would still
have owned them, but he could not claim any legitimate expectation of privacy." 448 U.S. at 106.
Apparently the view is that Rawlings' "precipitous action" shows a desire not to maintain privacy
and may be considered a waiver of his fourth amendment rights.
350. 448 U.S. at 105.
351. In United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 905 (9th Cir. 1973), the court counseled against
such an approach, noting that the reasonableness of a privacy expectation should not be reduced
because an intrusion upon it has occurred repeatedly. See Comment, supra note 148, at 839 (even
if we do become accustomed to such invasions, at least a minimum level of privacy must be
preserved to maintain "a democratic spirit").
352. 448 U.S. at 117-18 (Marshall, J., dissenting). As Justice Marshall stated, "This holding
cavalierly rejects the fundamental principle, unquestioned until today, that an interest in either the
place searched or the property seized is sufficient to invoke the Constitution's protections against
unreasonable searches and seizures." Id. at 114.
353. Id. at 121.
354. Professor Amsterdam has observed that "the [exclusionary] rule is a needed, but grud-
ingly taken, medicant; no more should be swallowed than is needed to combat the disease." Am-
sterdam, Search, Seizure and Section 2255: A Comment, 112 U. Pa. L. Rev. 378, 389 (1964).
355. 394 U.S. 165, 200 (1969) (Fortas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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relating to the defendant. 356 This view is very persuasive if it is conceded that
for the exclusionary rule to function properly, there must be a substantial like-
lihood that its operation will have a significant deterrent effect, and that the
maximum deterrent impact consistent with "standing" will result if illegally
seized evidence is not admissible against the "target of police investigation."
Justice Harlan, in Alderman, rejected the "target" approach, believing that the
administrative burden does not justify the marginal increase in fourth amend-
ment protection.357 In following Justice Harlan's counsel, Justice Rehnquist,
in Rakas, noted the substantial social cost exacted each time the exclusionary
rule is applied and refused to enlarge the class of persons who may invoke the
rule to include "the target of investigation."
358
Even if it is agreed that the exclusionary rule should iot operate unless
there is a substantial likelihood that its operation will have a significant deter-
rent effect, the deterrence goal should require exclusion when the government
purposefully acts illegally against one individual in order to obtain evidence
against another.359 But the Court, in United States v. Payner,360 adhered to
the Alderran rationale that the additional benefits of extending the exclusion-
ary rule, even in these circumstances, are outweighed by the societal interest in
presenting probative evidence to the jury.
361
In Payner, the Court was asked to affirm the district court's use of its
supervisory power to exclude tainted evidence. The district court found that
the Internal Revenue Service, in a project known as "Operation Trade
Winds," had launched an investigation into the financial activities of Ameri-
can citizens in the Bahamas. The I.R.S. had affirmatively counseled its agents
that the fourth amendment limitations permitted them purposefully to conduct
an unconstitutional search and seizure against a bank officer in order to obtain
evidence against Payner, the real target of the governmental intrusion. The
Court, in determining that Payner possessed no privacy interest in the docu-
ments unlawfully seized from the bank officer, concluded that similar societal
interests are at stake when a criminal defendant invokes a court's supervisory
power to suppress evidence seized in violation of a third party's constitutional
rights as when the traditional "standing" rules are applied. 3
62
By basing its analysis entirely on fourth amendment standing concepts
and its balancing considerations, the Payner Court gave insufficient weight to
the companion reason for exclusion, that of preserving judicial integrity.
Whatever tension there is in choosing between competing social interests in
applying traditional standing limitations, these competing interests do
change363 when the government deliberately chooses to sacrifice the constitu-
356. Id. at 208-09. See also White & Greenspan, supra note 298, at 349-54.
357. 394 U.S. at 188 n.1 (Harlan, 3., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
358. 439 U.S. at 132-37.
359. See generally Trager & Lobenfeld, supra note 298.
360. 447 U.S. 727 (1980).
361. Id. at 735-36 n.8.
362. Id. at 734.
363. Compare with 447 U.S. at 736 ("The values assigned to the competing interests do not
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tional rights of one individual in order to prosecute another. Once the product
of this unconstitutional search is permitted to be used as evidence, the Court is
not merely tolerating, but encouraging unconstitutional searches. By allowing
the government deliberately to circumvent its own standing rules, the Court
places its imprimatur upon such lawlessness and thereby taints its own integ-
rity. The atomistic personal aggrievement standing concept is much too nar-
row when there is purposefully illegal conduct by the government to
circumvent constitutional guarantees. The government's evil is generally cre-
ating an incentive for constitutional violations, and under these circumstances
the standing doctrine must be broadened to include "the target theory."
3 64
The Supreme Court's grudging acceptance of the exclusionary rule, with
its exacting substantial social cost, has caused it misgivings as to the benefit of
enlarging the group of persons who may invoke the rule.365 Before Rakas two
separate, analytically distinct determinations were made by the Court in de-
veloping its fourth amendment jurisprudence: first, whether the search in-
fringed upon any interest of the complaining party which the fourth
amendment was designed to protect, and second, whether that search was
"reasonable." These inquiries address similar principles postulated in Katz
and its progeny and a closer relationship will serve most effectively to harmo-
nize the competing interests with which the Court is concerned. But to col-
lapse them into a single formula invites confusion3 66 and permits the Court
change because a court has elected to analyze the question under the supervisory power instead of
the Fourth Amendment.")
364. Justice Douglas, in Wilson v. Schnettler, 365 U.S. 381 (1961), observed that "[u]nder the
Fourth Amendment, the judiciary has a special duty of protecting the right of the people to be let
alone," id. at 394, and that "the command of the Fourth Amendment implies a continuous super-
vision by the judiciary over law enforcement officers, quite different from the passive role which
courts play in some spheres." Id. at 396 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
365. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. at 137-38. The Rakas majority expressed its misgiving by
stating:
Each time the exclusionary rule is applied it exacts a substantial social cost for the vindi-
cation of Fourth Amendment rights. Relevant and reliable evidence is kept from the
trier of fact and the search for truth at trial is deflected .... [Mlisgivings as to the bene-
fit of enlarging the class of persons who may invoke the rule are properly considered
when deciding whether to expand standing to assert Fourth Amendment violations.
Id. (citations omitted).
366. Justice Blackmun, in his concurring opinion in Rawlings, continued to speak of an analy-
sis in terms of two separate steps for the determination of standing. He stated that in order to
avoid confusion two steps remained crucial to the inquiry:
The first is "whether [a] disputed search or seizure has infringed an interest of the de-
fendant which the Fourth Amendment was designed to protect," . . . the second is
whether "the challenged search or seizure violated [that] Fourth Amendment right
448 U.S. at 112 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
Furthermore, Justice Blackmun posited that
[i]t remains possible for a defendant to prove that his legitimate interest of privacy was
invaded, and yet fail to prove that the police acted illegally in doing so. And it is equally
possible for a defendant to prove that the police acted illegally, and yet fail to prove that
his own privacy interest was affected.
Id.
It is interesting to observe that in Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979), the Court appar-
ently made a two-step standing merits analysis by holding that there was no question that a pas-
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under what has basically been an atomistic view of standing, a concept that
was developed to temper the social costs involved in the application of the
exclusionary rule, to substantially diminish, as in Rakas and Rawlings, the
substantive protections afforded by the fourth amendment.
Jones began, and Katz expanded, the parameters of the fourth amend-
ment's coverage "by recognizing that privacy interests are protected even
when they do not arise from property rights. '367 In liberalizing the standing
rules to allow a broadened scope of privacy in the premises to include "legiti-
mate presence," the Court, in Jones, did not discard interests that historically
had been sheltered by the fourth amendment. Katz's "reasonable expectations
of privacy" doctrine was also not intended to contract privacy protections but
rather to broaden the fourth amendment's privacy shield? 68 The Rakas and
Rawlings decisions have failed to fulfill this expectation.
CONCLUSION
It is apparent that the Court has only begrudgingly accepted the exclu-
sionary doctrine and is presently embarked on a process of limiting its ef-
fect.3 6 9 As this Article has indicated, severe erosion of fourth amendment
protections has occurred under the application of Katz's "reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy" test. The relationship between an individual's reasonable pri-
vacy expectations and societal norms plays a significant role in harmonizing
the dissonance between the individual entitled to claim fourth amendment
protections and the scope of those rights. A defendant, under Katz, must show
that his privacy expectations under the circumstances are reasonable, that is,
that they reflect societal norms. But the importance of a particular privacy
interest is a value judgment that must be assigned an appropriate weight in
determining whether to bring it within the fourth amendment's protective
ambit.
370
In certain classes of cases, countervailing privacy values may be so so-
cially significant as to require strict adherence to constitutional safeguards. In
United States v. Miller,371 the Court, in concluding that Miller had no pro-
tectible fourth amendment privacy interest in microfilmed copies of his
records maintained by the bank, failed to evaluate the privacy interest in-
senger had standing to challenge the search of his personal luggage taken from an automobile. Id.
at 761 n.8.
367. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. at 119 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
368. As stated by the majority in Katz, the fourth amendment "protects individual privacy
against certain kinds of governmental intrusion, but its protections go further, and often have
nothing to do with privacy at all." 389 U.S. at 350.
369. See note 365 and accompanying text supra. As Justice White in Rakas v. Illinois so aptly
stated:
[i]f the Court is troubled by the practical impact of the exclusionary rule, it should face
the issue of that rule's continued validity squarely instead of distorting other doctrines in
an attempt to reach what are perceived as the correct results in specific cases.
439 U.S. at 157 (White, J., dissenting).
370. See Kitch, supra note 27, at 141-42, 150-52.
371. 425 U.S. 435 (1976). See text accompanying notes 177-88 supra.
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volved--that is, what value society places upon the privacy of its bank records;
is it significant enough to require judicial supervision or can the government
practice continue virtually unregulated? In Miller, instead of differentiating
between activities in which an individual to function efficiently is compelled
by contemporary society to yield certain privacy interests and others where he
is not, the Court took the position that the individual who permits his activities
to be viewed by a particular group for a limited and specific purpose must
sacrifice his privacy interests vis-A-vis the government. 372 The Court does not
explain satisfactorily why an individual who uses a bank's facilities and, there-
fore, consents to the bank teller viewing his bank activities briefly, and for a
limited purpose, must surrender his privacy expectations to the government
with respect to these activities.
In the misplaced confidence cases, the Court weighed the privacy expecta-
tions of an individual engaged in crime against the need for effective law en-
forcement.373 By pegging the individual's conversational privacy interest in
talking with his confederates at the lowest end of the sliding scale of fourth
amendment privacy protections, and the government's interest in using infor-
mants at the highest level of necessary law enforcement techniques, the Court
concluded that individuals engaged in criminal activities must assume the risk
that persons to whom they confide may be government informants. The Court
was thus able to conclude that the criminal conversations between the defend-
ant and the government informer were not protected privacies, and the gov-
ernment capture of them, even by electronic means, was not a "search"
protected by the fourth amendment. By casting its risk analysis in terms of
criminal conduct, the White decision imposed on everyone the risk of uncon-
trolled government informer eavesdropping. Whatever the merit supporting
the broad power of the government to use informants in this manner, the
White analytical framework never considers the nature of this highly intrusive
police practice and its probable impact on our basic notions of the privacy
values placed upon maintaining innocent conversations. As Justice Harlan
counseled, the proper analysis must go beyond the search for subjective expec-
tations and assumption of risks. The value we place on the privacy interest is
the "central element" involved in judging the reasonableness of the govern-
ment intrusion.
374
The level at which the Court places the privacy interest involved is central
to the application of the fourth amendment. This is best illustrated by Justice
Bradley's expansive holding in Boyd v. United States375 that any compulsory
production by the government of private books and papers "is contrary to the
principles of a free government" and is incapable of surviving "the pure at-
372. 425 U.S. at 443. See Note, A Reconsideration of the Katz Expectation of Privacy Test, 76
Mich. L. Rev. 154, 166-68 (1977). The Miller Court additionally based its holding, that none of
the defendant's fourth amendment rights had been violated, on the facts that he could claim
neither a possessory nor an ownership interest in the microfilm. 425 U.S. at 440.
373. See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 785-87 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
374. Id. at 786.
375. 116 U.S. 616 (1886). See text accompanying notes 30, 31, 43-48 supra.
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mosphere of political liberty and personal freedom. ' 376 By placing a high
value on the nature of a person's private papers, the Boyd Court looked be-
yond the method the government used and raised an absolute bar to govern-
ment intrusion into private documents. Boyd creatively intertwined the fourth
and fifth amendments to protect "the sanctity of a man's home and the priva-
cies of life,"377 thereby recognizing the fundamental value of absolute privacy
protection for personal documents. The recent decisions of Fisher and Andre-
sen never addressed Boyd's main theme: the wisdom of maintaining an abso-
lute private enclave of individual privacy as a central value protected by the
fourth and fifth amendments. Instead, the Court's inquiry is focused primarily
upon the method the government used to secure private documents, signifi-
cantly narrowing Boyd's absolute ban on the ability of the government to ob-
tain private papers. By foregoing an analytical appraisal of the central value
in protecting private papers and the place on the hierarchical value scale that
private papers occupy,378 the Court missed an opportunity to consider whether
fourth amendment jurisprudence might support the theory that increasing de-
grees of intrusions require "increasing degrees ofjustification and increasingly
stringent procedures for the establishment of that justification." 379 Clearly,
such an analysis is warranted before the Court permits, as it did in Zurcher v.
StanfordDaily,380 the police to search private documents in the private files of
innocent third persons.
To bring "clarity and consistency" 381 to an area that abounds with confu-
sion and uncertainty requires separate analytical analyses of the privacy inter-
ests that the fourth amendment protects and of those individuals entitled
under particular fact patterns to these protections. Whether to extend the
fourth amendment's protection to include particular individuals requires a de-
termination of the need for additional deterrence weighed against the social
cost of exclusion. The importance of protecting a particular privacy right is
not balanced by these competing considerations; instead, the Court must de-
termine its value and then assign to it a weight on the sliding scale of privacy
interests to determine whether the affected privacy interests are significant
enough to warrant judicial protection. Indeed, once the Court does determine
that the privacy interest is sufficiently weighty to bring it within the fourth
amendment's orbit, then the amendment's procedural safeguards apply to all
government intrusions. The Court's analytical perspective can then be di-
rected to whether the particular intrusion in light of all the exigencies
presented is constitutionally permissible and, further, whether a particular in-
dividual affected is to benefit from any constitutional defects. When the Court
376. Id. at 632.
377. Id. at 630.
378. See McKenna, supra note 42.
379. Amsterdam, supra note 7, at 390.
380. 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
381. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 521 (1971) (White, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). In Coolidge, Justice White criticized the majority for refusing to attempt to
clarify the state of the law "by clinging to distinctions that are both unexplained and inexplica-
ble." Id.
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determines that a particular government practice does not undermine any of
the values protected by the fourth amendment, then the government practice
goes unregulated, saddled upon all of us. The question of fourth amendment
privacy protections ultimately must be determined by deciding whether this
type of unregulated government activity is one that we collectively, as mem-
bers of a free society, are willing to accept.382 A very close relationship exists
between the rights protected by the fourth amendment, and the persons enti-
tled under the facts to assert them; but to collapse these questions into a single
formula invites confusion and unprincipled judicial analysis. Such a merger
permits the Court to apply the narrowest conceivable interpretation to fourth
amendment standing, justifying its conclusion, as in Rakas and Rawlings, that
the specific facts of the particular case did not justify the individual's privacy
expectations. 383 This close factual distinction analysis is troublesome because
there are always methods to distinguish the multitude of dissimilar fact set-
tings, and by emphasizing the complexity of the factual situation, the Court is
permitted to bypass the difficult question of defining the privacy interest in-
volved and assigning to it an appropriate value for future guidance. This fac-
tual rather than doctrinal approach has failed, in many circumstances, to
provide any meaningful guidance in determining which individuals or privacy
interests are protected by the fourth amendment.
38 4
By limiting its inquiry to the individual's actual expectation and the ef-
forts he has taken to preserve his privacy, the Court is able by circuitous rea-
soning to alter society's perception of what the "legitimate privacy interests"
are and how they may be protected. By determining that the individual has
failed to take "normal precautions" to preserve his privacy, the Court has been
able to focus its inquiry on the subjective evaluation of the individual's per-
ceived desire to maintain his privacy in the circumstances presented, thereby
obviating the need to examine the government's activities or consider the rele-
vant fourth amendment privacy interests. By constant repetition, as in the au-
tomobile search cases, the Court can manipulate our expectations, thereby
diminishing society's collective belief that it is in fact reasonable to expect that
the privacy interest in question is protected by the fourth amendment's shield.
This unconfined analysis allows the Court to alter social perceptions to the
point that the protections afforded by the fourth amendment begin to ap-
proach the "evaporation point.' '385
382. See Amsterdam, supra note 7, at 403.
383. See text accompanying notes 323-33, 341-44 supra.
384. See Dworkin, supra note 35.
385. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752,.764-65 (1969).
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